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HEARING ON CYBERSECURITY OF VOTING MACHINES

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INTRODUCTION

Thank you for the opportunity to offer testimony on the important questions raised by the security of the technology used for elections in the United States.

For the last 25 years, my research and scholarship has focused on the security of cryptographic, computing and communications systems, especially as we rely on insecure platforms such as the Internet for increasingly critical applications. My work has focused particularly on the intersection of this technology with public policy issues. For example, in 2007, I led several of the teams that evaluated the security of computerized election systems from several vendors on behalf of the states of California and Ohio.

I am currently an associate professor in the computer and information science department at the University of Pennsylvania, where I direct the Distributed Systems Laboratory. From 1992 to 2004, I was a research scientist at AT&T Bell Laboratories. This testimony is not offered on behalf of any organization or agency.

In this testimony, I will give an overview of the security issues facing elections in the United States today, with emphasis on the risks and vulnerabilities inherent in Direct Recording Electronic (DRE “touchscreen”) voting machines as well as the exposure of our election infrastructure to disruption by national security adversaries.

I offer three specific recommendations:

- Paperless DRE voting machines should be immediately phased out from US elections in favor of systems, such as precinct-counted optical scan ballots, that leave a direct artifact of the voter’s choice.
- Statistical “risk limiting audits” should be used after every election to detect software failures and attacks.
- Additional resources, infrastructure, and training should be made available to state and local voting officials to help them more effectively defend their systems against increasingly sophisticated adversaries.
I. ELECTIONS AND SOFTWARE SECURITY

A consequence of our federalist system is that US elections are in practice highly decentralized, with each state responsible for setting its own standards and procedures for registering voters, casting ballots, and counting votes. The federal government sets broad standards for such issues as accessibility, but it is largely uninvolved in day-to-day election operations. In most states, election management functions are largely delegated to local county and town governments, which are responsible for registering voters, procuring voting equipment, creating ballots, setting up and managing local polling places, counting votes, and reporting the results of each contest. Thousands of individual local election offices thus manage and secure the voting process for most of the American electorate.

Elections in the US are among the most operationally and logistically complex in the world. Many jurisdictions have large numbers of geographically dispersed voters, and most elections involve multiple ballot contests and referenda. The requirements for protection against potentially very sophisticated adversaries, ballot secrecy, fair access to the polls, and rapid, accurate reporting of results make secure election management one of the most formidable – and potentially fragile – information technology problems in government.

Computers and software play central roles in almost every aspect of our election process: managing voter registration records, defining ballots, provisioning voting machines, tallying and reporting results, and controlling electronic voting machines used at polling places.\(^2\) The integrity and security of our elections are thus inexorably tied to the integrity and security of the computers and software that we rely on for these many functions.

The passage of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002 accelerated the computerization of voting systems, particularly with respect to the ways in which voters cast their ballots at local polling stations. HAVA provided funds for states to replace precinct voting equipment with “accessible” technology. Unfortunately, as implemented, some of this technology has had the unintended consequence of increasing the risk of elections being exposed to compromise by malicious actors.

\(^2\) Today, the “back office” of a typical election administration office is much like that of any modern business, with local computer networks tying together desktop computers, printers, servers, and Internet access. This increasing connectivity served as a critical avenue for what US intelligence agencies identified as Russian military intelligence actors.
A. Election Software and Hardware

A typical\textsuperscript{3} county election office today depends on computerized systems and software for virtually every aspect of registering voters and conducting elections. Generally, an election office workflow will include at least the following pre- and post-election functions:

\textit{Voter registration} – The ongoing maintenance of an authoritative database of registered voters in the jurisdiction, including the precinct-by-precinct “poll books” of voters (which might be on paper or in electronic form) that are used to check in voters at precinct polling stations.

\textit{Ballot definition} – The pre-election process of creating data files that list the various contests, candidates, and rules (e.g., number of permitted choices per race) that will appear on the ballot. The ballot definition is used to print paper ballots, to define what is displayed on touchscreen voting terminals, and to control the vote tallying and reporting software. Local races (such as school boards) may sometimes require that different ballot definitions be created for different precincts within a county in any given election.

\textit{Voting machine provisioning} – The pre-election process of configuring the individual precinct voting machines for an election. This typically includes resetting internal memory and loading the appropriate ballot definition for each precinct. Depending on the model of voting machine, provisioning typically involves using a computer to write removable memory cards that are installed in each machine.

\textit{Absentee and early ballot processing} – The process of reading and tabulating ballots received by mail and from early voting polling places. Mail votes are typically processed in bulk by high-volume optical scan ballot reading equipment.

\textit{Tallying and reporting} – The post-election process of tabulating the results for each race received from each precinct and reporting the overall election outcomes. This process typically involves using a computer to read memory card media retrieved from precinct voting machines.

\textsuperscript{3} The precise nature of the systems used and how they interact with one another will vary somewhat depending on the vendors from which the systems were purchased and the practices of the local jurisdiction.
Each of the above “back end” functions employs specialized software running on computers. Depending on the size and practices of the county, the same computers may be used for more than one function (e.g., the ballot definition computer might also serve as the tallying and reporting computer). These computers are typically off-the-shelf desktop machines running a standard operating system (such as Microsoft Windows), equipped with electronic mail and web browser software along with specialized voting software. Election office computers are typically connected to one another via a wired or wireless local area network, which may have a direct or indirect connection (sometimes via a firewall) to the Internet.

In some jurisdictions, some of the various back end functions (most often those concerned with voter registration databases and ballot definition), may be outsourced by a county or state to an election service contractor. These contractors provide specialized assistance with such as creating ballots in the correct format, managing voter registration databases, creating precinct poll books, and maintaining voting machines. Not all jurisdictions employ contractors, however.

Voting equipment used at precincts is computerized as well, although generally packaged in specialized hardware rather than off-the-shelf equipment. This equipment includes:

Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Voting Machines – DRE machines are special-purpose computers that display ballot choices to the voter (based on the ballot definition) and record voter choices. Both the ballot definition configuration and the vote count are typically stored on removable memory media.⁴

Optical Scan Ballot Readers – Optical scan ballot readers are specialized computers that read voter-marked paper ballots. The ballot is read according to the ballot definition configuration (typically on removable memory media), and a tally is maintained in memory (also typically on removable media). The machine also captures the scanned ballots and stores them in a mechanically secured ballot box.

Ballot Marking Devices – Ballot marking devices are an assistive

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⁴ Some models of DRE machines can be equipped with a Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) option in which the voters’ selections are printed on a paper tape roll that is visible to the voter. VVPATs can assist with determining the voter’s intent during a recount, but their efficacy depends on each voter’s diligence in confirming that their choices are correctly recorded on the paper tape before they leave the voting booth.
technology used in optical scan systems to allow visually or mobility impaired voters to create ballots for subsequent scanning. They are similar to DRE machines in that they display (or read aloud) the ballot electronically, based on a ballot definition configuration, and accept voter choices for each race. However, instead of recording the choices in memory, they print a marked paper ballot that can then be submitted through an optical scan ballot reader.

*Electronic Poll Books* – These devices are typically tablet-style computers that contain an authoritative copy of the database of registered voters at each precinct. Electronic poll books are not used directly by voters, but rather by precinct poll workers as voters are checked in at their polling place. They are not used in all jurisdictions.

**B. Software and Election Security**

Complex software systems are notoriously difficult to secure, and those that perform the various functions described above are no exception. There are several avenues of vulnerability in such systems. Common software “bugs” often introduce vulnerabilities that can be exploited by an adversary to silently compromise the integrity of data or make unauthorized (and difficult to detect) changes to the behavior of systems. Configuration and system management errors (such as the use of vulnerable out-of-date platforms and weak passwords) can further compromise security. Computer networks (which are not generally used by precinct voting machines themselves but are commonly connected to back end systems in election offices) compound these risks by introducing the possibility of remote attack over the Internet.

The integrity of the vote today largely depends on the integrity of the software systems – running on voting machines and on county election office networks – over which elections are conducted. Any security weakness in any component of any of these systems can serve as a “weak link” that can allow a malicious actor to disrupt election operations, alter tally results, or disenfranchise voters.

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5 The fact that software systems can be, and often are, insecure and vulnerable to attack is not unique to election systems, of course. Serious data breaches are literally daily events across the public and private sectors, and cybersecurity is widely recognized to be a serious national security problem. To the extent that elections depend on software or are administered by networked computing systems, they are subject to all the same risks.
In many electronic voting systems in use today, a successful attack that exploits a software flaw might leave behind little or no forensic evidence. This can make it effectively impossible to determine the true outcome of an election or even that a compromise has occurred.

Unfortunately, these risks are not merely hypothetical or speculative. Many of the software and hardware technologies that support US elections today have been shown to suffer from serious and easily exploitable security vulnerabilities that could be used by an adversary to alter vote tallies or cast doubt on the integrity of election results.
II. DRE ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS HAVE PROVEN VULNERABLE TO A RANGE OF KNOWN, EXPLOITABLE SECURITY FLAWS

Security concerns about computerized voting systems have been raised from the moment such systems were first proposed. Most of these concerns have focused on electronic voting equipment used at polling stations, although the “back end” software used to manage voter registration, provision voting machines, and tally are also critical to the integrity of the vote.

From a security perspective, the most problematic and risky class of electronic voting systems are those that employ Direct Recording-Electronic (DRE) machines. DRE machines are special purpose computers programmed to present the ballot to the voter and record the voter’s choices on an internal digital medium such as a memory card. At the end of the election day, the memory card containing the vote tallies for each race is generally removed or electronically read from the machine and delivered to the county election office, where the tallies from each precinct are recorded by the county tallying software. DRE machines are sometimes informally called “touchscreen” voting machines, although not all DRE models use actual touchscreen displays (nor are all voting devices that employ touchscreens DREs).

The design of DREs makes them inherently difficult to secure and yet also makes it especially imperative that they be secure. This is because the accuracy and integrity of the recorded vote tally depends completely on the correctness and security of the machine’s hardware, software, and data. Every aspect of a DRE’s behavior, from the ballot displayed to the voter to the recording and reporting of votes, is under control of the DRE hardware and software. Any security vulnerability in this hardware or software, or any ability for an attacker to alter (or re-load new and maliciously behaving) software running on the machine, not only has the potential to alter the vote tally, but can make it impossible to conduct a meaningful recount (or even to detect that an attack has occurred) after the fact.

DRE-based systems introduce several avenues for attack that are generally not present (or as security-critical) in other voting technologies. Successful exploitation of any one of these attack vectors can compromise elections in ways from which it may not be possible to recover:

- Alteration or deletion of vote tallies stored in internal memory or removable media
• Alteration or deletion of ballot definition parameters displayed to voters.

• Alteration or deletion of electronic log files used for post-election audits and detecting unauthorized tampering.

These attacks might be carried out in any of several ways, each of which must be reliably defended against by the DRE hardware and software:

• Direct tampering with data files stored on memory cards or accessible through external interface ports.

• Unauthorized replacement of the certified software running on the machine with a maliciously altered version.

• Exploitation of a pre-existing vulnerability in the certified software.

Successfully exploiting just one of these avenues of attack can be sufficient to undetectably compromise an election. The design of DREs makes it necessary not only that the hardware be highly secure against unauthorized tampering, but that the certified software running on them not suffer from any vulnerabilities that could be exploited by a malicious actor. This makes the security requirements for DREs more stringent – and more easily defeated – than for almost any other current election technology.

Unfortunately, the DRE-based systems purchased by and used in various states under HAVA have repeatedly been found to suffer from exactly these kinds of exploitable hardware and software vulnerabilities.

A. The 2007 California and Ohio Studies

To date, the most extensive independent studies of the security of electronic voting systems were commissioned ten years ago by the Secretaries of State of California and Ohio. Expert review teams were

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6 An incorrect (or maliciously altered) DRE ballot definition can make it impossible to determine the true election results even without any malicious software exploitation. For example, in York County, PA, a DRE ballot definition programming error in the 2017 general election appears to have allowed candidates in some local races to be voted for twice, with the possible consequence that the election will have to be invalidated and redone. See http://www.ydr.com/story/news/2017/11/08/voting-machine-problems-what-york-countys-options/843423001/. Paper-based systems, in contrast, are more robust against such errors. For example, the 2000 general election in Bernalillo County, NM had a similar error in their punch card counting software, but was later able to correct the error without a new election; see https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB976838091124686673.
given access to the voting machine hardware and software source code of every system certified for use in those states. The systems used in California and Ohio were also certified for use in most of the rest of the country, so these studies effectively covered a large fraction of available electronic voting equipment and software. I led the teams that reviewed the Sequoia products (for the state of California) and the ES&S products (for the state of Ohio); other teams in these studies reviewed the Diebold/Premier and Hart InterCivic products.⁷

In both studies, every team found and reported serious exploitable vulnerabilities in almost every component examined. In most cases, these vulnerabilities could be exploited by a single individual, who would need no more access than an ordinary poll worker or voter. Such an attacker would be able to alter vote tallies, load malicious software, or erase audit logs. Some of the vulnerabilities found were the consequence of software bugs, while others were caused by fundamental architectural properties of the system architecture and design. In some cases, compromise of a single system component (such as a precinct voting machine) was sufficient to compromise not just the vote tally on that machine, but to compromise the entire county back end system.

In response, California and Ohio ordered some equipment decertified and some election-day procedures modified. However, all the vulnerable equipment and software remained certified for use in at least some other states.

Some equipment vendors and local voting officials claimed at the time that the findings of the California and Ohio studies were irrelevant or overstated, that any problems identified could be easily fixed, and that it would be difficult or impossible for anyone but an expert with extensive experience and access to privileged information (such as source code) to exploit vulnerabilities in practice. However, as exercises such as the DEFCON Voting Village (described below) have demonstrated, not only do these systems remain vulnerable, but they can be readily exploited by people with no more than ordinary computer science experience and expertise and without access to any secret or proprietary information.

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⁷ The various final reports of the California “Top-To-Bottom Review” studies can be found at [http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting-systems/oversight/top-bottom-review/](http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting-systems/oversight/top-bottom-review/). The final report of the Ohio “Project EVEREST” study can be found at [https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/28/EVEREST.pdf](https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/28/EVEREST.pdf)
B. The 2017 DEFCON Voting Machine Village Exercise

The DEFCON conference is one of the world’s largest and best-known computer security “hacker” conferences. This year’s DEFCON was held July 27-30, 2017 in Las Vegas, NV, and drew approximately 25,000 participants from around the world. DEFCON participants have broad interest in technology, and include security researchers from industry, government, and academia, as well as individual hobbyists.

This year, for the first time, DEFCON featured a Voting Machine Hacking Village (“Voting Village”) to give participants an opportunity to examine and get hands-on experience with the security technology used in US elections, including voting machines, voter registration databases, and election office networks. I was one of the organizers of the Voting Village.\(^8\)

The voting machines available in the Voting Village were chiefly DRE models. We acquired (from the surplus market) and made available to participants a sampling of 25 pieces of election hardware, including voting machines and “electronic poll books” used by precinct workers to verify and check in voters at polling places. All but one model of machine in the Voting Village is still certified for use in U.S. elections in at least one jurisdiction today. The Voting Village also featured a mock back-office training “range” to simulate back-end databases and networks of county election administrators.

The DEFCON Voting Village was not intended to be a formal security assessment or test, but rather an opportunity for a general audience of technologists to examine election equipment and systems. However, participants were encouraged to critically examine and probe the equipment and software for vulnerabilities, and to seek practical ways to compromise security mechanisms. No proprietary information, computer source code, or specialized tools were made available.

The results of the Voting Village were summarized in detail in a report.\(^9\) It is notable that participants, who did not have any previous special expertise in voting machines or access to any proprietary information or source code, were very quickly able to find ways to compromise every piece of equipment in the Village by the end of the weekend. Depending on the

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8 Organizers of the DEFCON Voting Village included the author as well as Jake Braun, Hari Hursti, Joseph Lorenzo Hall, Margaret MacAlpine, and Jeff Moss.

9 The final report is available for download at: [https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-25/DEFCON%2025%20voting%20village%20report.pdf](https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-25/DEFCON%2025%20voting%20village%20report.pdf)
individual model of machine, participants found ways to load malicious software, gain access to administrator passwords, compromise recorded votes and audit logs, or cause equipment to fail. In most cases, these attacks could be carried out from the ordinary interfaces that are exposed to voters and precinct poll workers. The first machine was compromised by a participant within 90 minutes of the doors opening.

The ease with which participants compromised equipment in the Voting Village should be regarded as both alarming and yet also unsurprising. It is alarming because the very same equipment is in use in polling places around the United States, relied on for the integrity of real elections. But it is also ultimately unsurprising. Versions of every machine at DEFCON had been examined in the 2007 studies and found to suffer from basic, exploitable security vulnerabilities. It should not come as any surprise that, given access and motivation, people of ordinary skill in computer security would be able to replicate these results. It is, in fact, exactly what previous studies of these machines warned would happen.

In summary, the DEFCON Voting Village demonstrated that much of the DRE voting technology used in the US is vulnerable not just to hypothetical expert attack in a laboratory environment, but also to practical exploitation in the field by non-specialists.
III. CURRENT ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS HAVE NOT BEEN ENGINEERED TO RESIST NATION-STATE ADVERSARIES

The traditional “threat model” against which electronic voting systems have been evaluated has been focused on resisting traditional election fraud, in which criminal conspirators, perhaps assisted by corrupt poll workers or election officials, attempt to “rig” an election to favor a preferred candidate in a local, state, or national contest. Fraud might be accomplished by altering votes, adding favorable votes, deleting unfavorable votes, or otherwise compromising the security mechanisms that protect the ballot and tally.

While virtually every study of electronic voting technology has raised questions about the ability of current systems to resist serious efforts at fraud, traditional election fraud is not the only kind of threat, or even the most serious practical threat, that a voting systems must resist today.

Electronic voting systems must resist not only fraud from corrupt candidates and supporters, but also election disruption from hostile nation-state adversaries. This is a much more formidable threat, and one that current systems, especially those using DRE technology, are even less equipped to resist.

The most obvious difference between traditional fraud from corrupt candidates and disruption by hostile state actors is the expected resources and capabilities available to the attacker. The intelligence services of even relatively small nations can marshal far greater financial, technical, and operational resources than even the most sophisticated corrupt domestic criminal attacker. For example, intelligence services can be expected to conduct espionage operations against the voting system supply chain. In such operations, the aim might be to obtain confidential source code or to secure surreptitious access to equipment before it is even shipped to county officials. Hostile intelligence services can exploit information and other assets developed broadly over extended periods of time, often starting well before any specific operation or attack has been planned.

But their greater resources are not the most important way that hostile state actors can be a more formidable threat than corrupt candidates or poll workers. They also have easier goals. The aim of traditional “retail” election fraud is to tilt the outcome in favor of a particular candidate. That is, to succeed, the attacker must generally alter the reported vote count or
add, change, or delete votes. But a hostile state actor – via an intelligence service such as Russia's GRU – might be satisfied with merely disrupting an election or calling into question the legitimacy of the official outcome. With election systems so heavily dependent on demonstrably insecure software and voting equipment, this kind of disruption could be comparatively simple to accomplish, even at a national scale.

A hostile state actor who can compromise even a handful of county networks might not need to alter any actual votes to create widespread uncertainty about an election outcome’s legitimacy. It may be sufficient to simply plant suspicious (and detectable) malicious software on a few voting machines or election management computers, create some suspicious audit logs, delete registered voters from the rolls, or add some obviously spurious names to the voter rolls. If the preferred candidate wins, they can simply do nothing (or, ideally, use their previously arranged access to restore the compromised networks to their original states, erasing any evidence of compromise). If the “wrong” candidate wins, however, they could covertly reveal evidence that county election systems had been compromised, creating public doubt about whether the election had been “rigged”. This could easily impair the ability of the true winner to effectively govern, at least for a period of time.

Electronic voting machines and vote tallies are not the only potential targets for such attacks. Of particular concern are the back end systems that manage voter registration, ballot definition, and other election management tasks. Compromising any of these systems (which are often connected, directly or indirectly, to the Internet and therefore potentially remotely accessible) can be sufficient to disrupt an election while the polls are open or cast doubt on the legitimacy of the reported result. The decentralization of election operations, managed by thousands of individual local offices throughout the nation (with widely varying resources) is sometimes cited as a strength of our electoral process. However, this decentralization can be turned to the adversary’s advantage. An attacker can choose arbitrarily from among whatever counties have the weakest systems – those with the least secure software or most poorly defended networks and procedures – to target.

It is beyond the scope of my testimony to speculate on specific intrusions that occurred against state and local election management systems in the 2016 US general election, much of which remain under investigation. It has been reported that voter registration management systems in at least several states were targeted for exploitation and access. It
is unclear whether voting machines or tallying systems were also targeted. However, targeting and exploiting such systems would have been well within the capability of any major rival intelligence service.

In summary, the architecture of current electronic voting systems, especially those based on DRE voting machines, makes disruption attacks especially attractive to adversaries and difficult to effectively prevent. These systems can give hostile state actors interested in disruption an even easier task than that facing corrupt candidates seeking to steal even a small local office. And the consequences of election disruption strike at the very heart of our national democracy.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: US ELECTIONS SHOULD EMPLOY PAPER BALLOTS AND RISK-LIMITING AUDITS

It is perhaps tempting to conclude pessimistically that election technology in the US is fatally flawed, leaving our nation irreparably vulnerable to election fraud and foreign meddling. But while it is true that the current situation exposes us to significant risk, it is by no means hopeless or beyond repair. Relatively simple, and available, technologies can be deployed that render our elections significantly more robust against attack.

While DRE voting machines suffer demonstrably fundamental weaknesses, other electronic voting technologies are significantly more resilient in the face of compromise. The most important feature required is that there be a reliable record of each voter’s true ballot selections that can be used as the basis for a recount if the software systems fail or are called into question.

Among currently available, HAVA-compliant voting technologies, the state of the art in this regard are precinct-counted optical scan systems. In such systems, the voter fills out a machine-readable paper ballot form (possibly with the aid of an assistive ballot marking device for language-, visually- and mobility-impaired voters), which is deposited into a ballot scanning device that reads the ballot choices, maintains an electronic tally, and retains and secures the marked paper ballots for subsequent audit. After the polls close, the electronic tally records are read from each ballot scanner and the election results calculated.

The paper records of votes that precinct-counted optical-scan systems provide are a necessary, but not by themselves sufficient, safeguard against software compromise in a computerized election system. Non-DRE systems can still suffer from flaws and exploitable vulnerabilities in voting machine and back end software. The second essential safeguard is a reliable process for detecting whether the software is reporting incorrect results, and to recover the true results if so.

The most reliable and well-understood method to achieve this is through an approach called risk-limiting audits.\footnote{A good introduction to the theory and practice of risk limiting audits in elections can be found at https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/RLAwhitelinepaper12.pdf.} In a risk limiting audit, a statistically significant randomized sample of precincts have their paper
ballots manually counted by hand and the results compared with the electronic tally. (This must be done for every contest, not just those with close results that might otherwise call into question the outcome.) If discrepancies are discovered between the manual and electronic tallies, additional manual counts are conducted. The effect of risk-limiting audits is not to eliminate software vulnerabilities, but to ensure that the integrity of the election outcome does not depend on the herculean task of securing every software component in the system. This important property is called strong software independence.\textsuperscript{11}

Optical scan paper ballots and risk-limiting audits comprise a critical, and readily deployable, safeguard against both traditional election fraud and nation-state disruption. Taken together, they permit us to more safely enjoy the benefits of computerized election management, without introducing significant new costs or requiring the development of speculative new technology. The technology required for this is available \textit{today}, from multiple vendors, and is already in use in many states.

As important as paper ballots and risk-limiting audits are, however, they are not panaceas that solve every threat to our elections. It is also critical that the state and county backend computer networks and systems used for election management and voter registration be vigilantly protected against compromise. As we saw in 2016, hostile adversaries might attempt to breach not just voting machines, but also backend election management systems and voter registration database systems, which are often connected, directly or indirectly, to the Internet.

It is no exaggeration to observe that state and local election officials serve on the front lines of our national cybersecurity defense. They must be given sufficient resources, infrastructure, and training to help them effectively defend their systems against an increasingly sophisticated – and increasingly aggressive – threat environment. It is notable that the budgets for election administration often must compete for resources with essential local services such as fire protection and road maintenance. Election management represents only a miniscule fraction of the total national spending on political campaigns. Additional investment here will pay significant dividends for our security.

Simply put, much of our election infrastructure remains vulnerable

to practical attack, with threats that range from traditional election tampering in local races to large-scale disruption by national adversaries. We should take no comfort if such attacks have not yet been widely detected. At best, it is only because, for whatever reason, serious attempts have not yet been made. It is only a matter of time before they will.

Safeguards such as those described above serve our democracy in critically important ways. They provide a significant improvement to election security, both in our ability to resist attack and in our ability to recover from attack should one occur. Perhaps most importantly, they provide meaningful assurance to voters that their votes truly count and that their elected officials are governing truly legitimately. Our republic cannot for long survive without the confidence that comes from that assurance.
Subcommittees handle specific areas of their parent committee's work. Subcommittees are formed by most Standing Committees to share specific tasks within the jurisdiction of that Standing committee. Standing Committees consider bills and decide whether or not to recommend or approve them for consideration by their respective chambers. Apart from this, Standing Committees also carry out oversight responsibility in monitoring agencies, programs, and activities within and outside their committee jurisdictions. Select or Special Committees generally handle oversight or housekeeping responsibilities. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Committee on Rules, Committee on Science and Technology, Committee on Small Business The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform is the main investigative committee in the U.S. House of Representatives. After Republicans gained control of the House in 1995, the committee was reorganized to include just seven subcommittees. This reorganization consolidated the jurisdiction previously covered by 3 full committees and 14 subcommittees, and resulted in a 50 percent cut in staff.[1] In 2007, Henry Waxman, (D-CA) the chairman of the committee proposed an additional reorganization which combined the duties of the seven previous subcommittees into five. This reorganization was ad Of the house oversight and government reform committee. Hearing on oversight of federal political advertisement laws and. Regulations October 24, 2017 testimony of randall rothenberg president and CEO interactive advertising bureau. 1. Chairman Hurd, Ranking Member Kelly, and Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.