Hoover, Palestine, and the American Jewish Community

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The state of Israel and its special relationship with the United States have been political realities for the better half of the twentieth century. Indeed, the fulfillment of political Zionism in the creation of a Jewish state has colored the interpretations of some scholars’ assessment of the pre-1948 period, often leading to a Zionocentric interpretation of U.S. interwar history. In a recent article published in *American Jewish History*, Rafael Medoff discusses the historiography of American Zionism and points to the somewhat unbalanced treatment of pre-World War II Zionism. Even though new scholarship has been more willing to scrutinize controversial topics, these studies have not paid enough attention to the phenomenon of non-Zionism as an important aspect of the American Zionist experience.

The years of the Hoover administration, in particular, have been largely ignored and an analysis of the triangular relationship between Hoover, Palestine, and the American Jewish community is long overdue. A closer look at the Palestine riots of August 1929 will shed new light on the American response to the crisis and reveal that the non-Zionism of key members of the American Jewish leadership influenced the degree of Jewish activism and intervention at high levels of government and in turn affected Hoover’s attitude and policy on Zionism.

A Zionocentric approach to interwar history deemphasizes the complex nature of Zionism and its nuanced relationship to American Jewish identity. There is a large body of literature discussing the nature of American Zionism and most historians acknowledge its uniqueness, since American Zionists, for the most part, do not envision migration to Palestine as the final and inescapable conclusion to Jewish nationalism. Consequently, American Jews, though supportive of a Jewish national home in Palestine, did not personally participate in the creation of it, and according to some scholars, the price of this cultural Zionism was its inability to respond to the cataclysmic events of the 1930s and 1940s. This interpretation,
however, glosses over two significant points. First, it washes over the finer nuances of American Zionism that encompass a wide spectrum of ideas and internal divisions. Second, it endorses the “what if” approach to history: If American Jews had been better Zionists, they would have been better equipped to deal with the refugee crisis and the Holocaust. Henry Feingold takes issue with the “what if” approach and deplores the Zionocentric discussion of American Jewish history. He also points to the fact that the wholesale Zionization of American Jewry was neither accomplished by ideological nor cultural Zionism, but by the reality of the refugee crisis.  

The Zionocentric approach also spills over into discussions concerning the dynamics between Zionism and U.S. foreign policy. Some studies charge that the Hoover administration had legal grounds to play a more activist role in Palestinian affairs and criticize the U.S. government’s reluctance on behalf of a Jewish national home in Palestine. State Department elitism and traditional WASP attitudes did play a role in formulating an anti-Zionist policy, but it would amount to historical reductionism to ignore other determining factors, both domestic and foreign. Any critical analysis must take into account such issues as the appeal of political Zionism to American Jews, the role and influence of anti-Zionists and/or non-Zionists, the principles and guidelines of Hoover’s foreign policy, the burgeoning rapprochement between the United States and Great Britain, and last but not least, the particular circumstances surrounding Palestine as a mandate of Great Britain and a hotbed of competing interests. 

Furthermore, a Zionocentric interpretation sometimes leads to an overestimation of the potency and uniformity of Jewish mobilization. Given the complexity of the Zionist movement during the interwar period and the diversity of opinions and actions within the Jewish community, notions of the Zionist lobby determining or even modifying policy are farfetched. 

And finally, not only have historians paid little attention to the dynamics between Zionism and the Hoover administration, but as yet no study has analyzed or even chronicled Herbert Hoover’s relationship with the American Jewish community. Many of the issues that have been debated exhaustively by Hoover historians like Joan Hoff, David Burner, Lloyd Craig, and Martin Fausold also reappear in his relations with American Jews. The many facets of Hoover’s character—engineer, progressive, humanitarian, aggressive introvert,
and administrative genius—are briefly touched upon and provide the parameters for an analysis of Hoover’s persona.6

The official U.S. response to Zionism and its aspirations for a Jewish national home in Palestine has followed a consistent historical pattern with different levels of government showing varying degrees of sympathy for Jewish nationalism in the Holy Land. Historically, Congress showed the strongest support and sympathy for Zionism and endorsed the idea of a Jewish national home as early as 1922. The executive branch has been somewhat less supportive, although every president since Woodrow Wilson has issued a statement of sympathy for the Palestine enterprise. The least support for Zionism has come from the State Department, where various officials were affiliated with the Protestant mission in the Middle East and thus showed keen interest in Arab nationalism and self-determination. At times the department has even shown outright hostility to the Zionist cause.7

The divided attitude of the U.S. government toward Zionism was especially obvious during the early years of the Palestine Mandate, when American Zionism was itself in disarray and debating various political and ideological aims. It was not until August 1929 that leaders of the Zionist and non-Zionist communities joined hands and established the Enlarged Jewish Agency to create a more united effort in building the Jewish national home in Palestine. This joint agreement rested on the willingness of both sides to advance the social and economic development of Palestine, whereby non-Zionists were the designated fund-raisers and expected to bankroll such projects. Although non-Zionists encouraged Zionism’s practical work in and for the Holy Land, they fervently rejected its underlying philosophy. The concept of non-Zionism in the United States centered on its opposition to a nationalist ideology. The non-Zionists persisted in their own definition of the term “Jewish national home,” agreeing with the Zionists that the Jews were in Palestine by right and therefore were entitled to develop the land without prejudice to the Arab population, but denying at the same time that the Jews were entitled to claim political sovereignty.8

The non-Zionist position is probably best illustrated in a letter from Louis Marshall, the powerful chairman of the American Jewish Committee (AJC), to Heinrich Stern of Berlin. “Let me premise by saying that I have never been a member of the Zionist Organization, that I am not a nationalist, and that I take pride in my American
citizenship and in my loyalty to Judaism. At the same time I have always felt an inner urge in favor of the up building [sic] of Palestine, in seeking to afford to such Jews as desired to take up their homes in the land of our fathers.” Shortly before the creation of the Enlarged Jewish Agency in August 1929, the so-called pact of glory between Zionist and non-Zionist Jews, Marshall warned Chaim Weizmann, president of the World Zionist Organization in London, that “it was important that the non-Zionists of this country—and the same is true of those of other lands—should not be called upon to surrender any of their convictions on matters which may be termed political in their nature, and that to use an American expression, the idea of ‘nationalism’ should not be ‘rubbed in.’”

With Zionism not clearly defined and encompassing a wide spectrum of interpretations, the response of the U.S. government to Zionist issues and events in Palestine has to be carefully evaluated. Historical studies have indicted the Hoover administration with charges ranging from aloofness, inaction, and indifference to outright hostility toward Zionist aspirations in the Holy Land. Yet, the movement of political Zionism was small, struggling to attract membership, to establish larger ground in the predominantly non-Zionist American Jewish community, and to increase access to the White House. Louis Lipsky, the head of the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), did not gain access to the Hoover White House. Max Rhoade, the designated Zionist lobbyist in Washington, only communicated with Hoover’s secretaries and was unable to gain the president’s ear even during the Palestine crisis of August 1929. The ZOA’s lack of centralized planning, coordination of resources, and sense of timing produced no tangible results. The non-Zionist shtadlanim of the American Jewish community, on the other hand, more readily fit the task of lobbying. Men like Louis Marshall and Felix M. Warburg had easier access to heads of both Jewish and non-Jewish
organizations, to government officials, and even to the chief executive, thereby considerably shaping Hoover’s outlook and approach toward Zionist issues.

Hoover’s acquaintance with members of the American Jewish community and his familiarity with some of their issues and concerns went back as far as 1917. Then appointed to head the American Food Administration and later the American Relief Administration (ARA) under President Wilson, Hoover quickly gained a reputation for efficiently managing relief throughout Europe. It was at this time that a young Jew named Lewis L. Strauss offered his services free of charge to Hoover and served as his private secretary in relief efforts throughout Europe. Strauss not only became one of Hoover’s most trusted friends but was devoted to him like a son. Two years with Hoover and European relief work led to Strauss’s job with Kuhn, Loeb & Co., which in turn introduced him to influential Republican German-Jewish leaders like Felix Warburg and Louis Marshall. Hoover, who had a tendency to rely on the expertise of trusted friends and advisors, gained in Strauss a valuable counsel on Jewish matters and a liaison between the Jewish community and American relief work in war-torn Europe.

Hoover’s record on aiding the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JJDC) relief efforts in Eastern Europe during and after World War I earned him a reputation as a humanitarian and special friend of the Jewish people and brought him into contact with the leading philanthropists of the American Jewish community. As early as 1920 Lewis Strauss wrote a feature article for the American Hebrew on Herbert C. Hoover and the Jews of Eastern Europe in which he painted Hoover as a champion of Jewish rights.

Since the primary efforts of American non-Zionists in the 1920s concentrated on European relief and issues affecting the rights of religious minorities, Hoover, as secretary of commerce, was contacted in his capacity as an efficient manager of relief and as a humanitarian. In the aftermath of the postwar Red Scare and in the context of the twenties’ resurgent nativism, Hoover’s messages regarding the idea and realization of a Jewish homeland in Palestine praised the project’s quality as “an asylum for the less fortunate masses of Jewish people.” The secretary of commerce, however, was careful to remind Jewish Americans that “America must be their real homeland.” Hoover then shared the non-Zionist view and objective of Jewish nation-building
in Palestine. As an engineer and progressive he showed keen interest in the social and economic development of Palestine and admired the technological accomplishments of Jewish pioneers. But as an American of the nativist 1920s, Hoover was concerned about any semblance of dual loyalty or unpatriotic activity.

In the wake of the 1928 presidential election, Hoover received high praise from members of the Jewish community, especially from those who had been in personal contact with him during the relief work in Europe. A 1929 booklet, chronicling and celebrating the relief efforts of the JJDC, was dedicated to Hoover the humanitarian. A campaign circular, written in English and Yiddish by Rabbi Abraham Burstein and distributed in New York, referred to Hoover as “The Modern Moses of War-Stricken Europe: He led Israel out of Slavery of Starvation and Despair.”

Yet, while Hoover’s record on Jewish matters was well known among his non-Zionist friends, most Jews were unaware of his service on behalf of European Jews. Louis Marshall, head of the American Jewish Committee, the largest Jewish organization in the United States at the time, realized that and therefore advised Hoover against any last-minute effort to increase the Jewish vote. This would be hypocritical of a Republican Party that only tended to court Jewish voters around election time. Felix Warburg agreed, praising Hoover for his character and the fact that he was not like professional politicians who purposely catered to Jews in order to get their votes. Hoover, according to Warburg, was even uncomfortable with the idea of advertising his actions on behalf of the Jews. “Knowing Mr. Hoover as I do, however, I am convinced that these and other facts [Hoover’s humanitarian work] can only be used in the campaign without his consent and therefore with great circumspection. He is extremely sensitive and would be embarrassed to find political capital manufactured from actions which he feels are
Little did Hoover know that the first foreign policy crisis of his presidency would involve Jewish America and the Zionist venture in Palestine. Political Zionism and American interests in Palestine were brought to the fore when, in the early months of the Hoover administration, the British mandate was badly shaken by a week of murder, pillage, and destruction. In August 1929 Arabs openly attacked Jews in Jerusalem, and rioting quickly spread throughout the country, leaving hundreds dead, including eight American Jews. The riots resulted from a dispute over religious observances at the Western Wall in Jerusalem and laid bare contradictory British pledges to both Arabs and Jews. The former were armed with the Husayn-McMahon correspondence and its promise of an independent Arab state, the latter with the Balfour Declaration’s endorsement of a Jewish national home in Palestine. In order to preserve British control in Palestine and to maintain the colonial upper hand throughout the Empire, a swift response was deemed necessary.

In addition to constituting days of reckoning for the newly elected British Labour government, the Palestine riots also forced the U.S. government to define its interests in Palestine. As has already been noted, a 1922 congressional resolution supported a Jewish national home in Palestine, and every administration since Woodrow Wilson’s had declared its sympathy for Jewish aspirations in the Holy Land. Moreover, an Anglo-American treaty of 1924 included the text of the Balfour Declaration and gave the United States the same rights in Palestine as any member of the League of Nations. These pronouncements, some historians argue, provided the Hoover administration with a basis to act on behalf of Zionist interests. But more than political resolutions and treaties guided Hoover’s course of action. Hoover was in the midst of cultivating an Anglo-American partnership as the cornerstone of his structure of peace and disarmament and he was not about to sour the atmosphere of rapprochement with an American policy of intervention. Moreover, Hoover relied on the expertise of trusted friends and advisors to provide him with insights into the nature of American Zionism and its agenda.

The American public and media closely followed the developments in Palestine. As the situation escalated and after the American consul in Jerusalem, Paul Knabenshue, reported that eight
Americans had died in the riots, the State Department received a veritable deluge of letters from all sections of society, urging the U.S. government to intervene on behalf of Jewish Americans and their property in Palestine. After years of existing as an outcast at the fringes of American society, the movement of Zionism received new momentum and mobilized the American Jewish community to action, invoking increased sympathy for the yishuv.23

Hoover received a Zionist delegation at the White House, and in a statement presented at a mass meeting at Madison Square Garden in New York City on August 29, 1929, he expressed his “profound sympathy” for the Palestine sufferers. Still, in both instances, the president made it clear that he had full confidence in the British government’s ability to restore order. Included in Hoover’s message of sympathy was his 1928 speech as secretary of commerce in which he praised the work of American Jews for the upbuilding of Palestine. Like his non-Zionist friends, Hoover encouraged Jewish settlement and development of the Holy Land, yet he stopped short of endorsing the creation of a Jewish nation-state. Herman Bernstein, a close friend of Hoover and the one accorded by the Arrangement Committee of the Madison Square Mass Meeting to read the president’s telegram of sympathy and encouragement, assured the chief executive that all speakers at this event heeded the president’s advice and eliminated from their speeches several paragraphs that contained fierce attacks on the British government.24

Various leaders of the American Jewish community supported the Hoover administration’s cautious course of action. Henry Rose of the National News Service notified Hoover that he had mailed an announcement throughout the United States regarding the situation in Palestine, calling for a halt of criticism directed against the administration. While the Palestine disturbances awakened American Zionism to an increased commitment toward a Jewish national home in Palestine, criticizing the British inability to quell the riots and demanding U.S. intervention, leaders of the non-Zionist German-Jewish establishment pursued a more cautious course and behind-the-scenes diplomacy. Warburg, as head of the American Administrative Committee of the Jewish Agency for Palestine,25 advised his friends in the Jewish community to express confidence in the British ability to suppress the riots and thereby secure the Hoover administration’s sympathy.

Upon news of the Palestine disturbances, the AJC called an
emergency meeting and turned to Lewis Strauss for information on Hoover’s attitude and intended course of action. Strauss had spent the weekend with Hoover at his retreat in Camp Rapidan, and as a member of the AJC’s executive committee he reported that the president had full confidence in the British government’s ability to deal with the Palestine situation. After members of the executive committee had discussed whether they should petition the U.S. president to dispatch a warship to Haifa in order to protect the lives and property of American citizens in Palestine, they unanimously decided to wait for Warburg’s opinion on the matter.

Warburg, who was known for his friendship with Hoover, also had connections with British Prime Minister Sir Ramsay MacDonald and was therefore in the best position to advise the proper course of action. Shuttling back and forth between the United States and Great Britain, Warburg cautioned American Jews not to criticize the British and convinced them to abandon the idea of sending a naval vessel to Haifa, at least for the time being. Bernstein’s recommendations were colored by the sentiments of the president, who he reported had expressed strong opposition to American intervention in what was a purely British matter and to the dispatch of an American warship, which he believed would unduly embarrass the British.

A week after the outbreak of rioting in Palestine, the British were able to get the situation under control, and as a result the correspondence between members of the AJC gradually lost urgency. By September 1, 1929, the AJC released a radio cable stating that strong representation of Jewish concerns had been made to both President Hoover and Secretary of State Henry Stimson and that “everything possible” had been done. In the same vein, Warburg, during his voyage on the SS Homeric from England to the United States, noted in his diary that the time had come for the mandatory government, Arab, and Jew to join hands “in constructive understanding and cooperation.” He also sent a telegram to Strauss in which he expressed support of the British and authorized the latter to convey its content to Hoover.

In the riots’ aftermath Warburg continued to support the British government and policy in Palestine. During the historic visit of Sir Ramsay MacDonald to the United States in October 1929 in order to strengthen the Anglo-American alliance on disarmament, he headed the delegation of American Jews to meet with the prime minister.
Chaim Weizmann, head of the World Zionist Organization, had arranged the meeting between MacDonald and Warburg and cautioned the latter that nothing should be done to make the prime minister’s stay in the United States unpleasant. While a British commission was underway to investigate the causes of the disturbances, Weizmann was careful to abstain from criticism and advised his American colleagues to do the same.32

Yet, Weizmann’s apparent attempt to put up a united Zionist front in support of the British was shattered by the organizational chaos and administrative problems of American Jewry. Warburg found himself increasingly at odds with the ZOA and was deeply upset that American Jews were not taken seriously since all decision-making power lay in London.33 He also became more and more concerned about the implications of Jewish nationalism and Zionist unwillingness to come to an agreement on a united policy, which was the “immediate establishment of livable conditions” in Palestine.34 James Marshall, son of the late Louis Marshall and another prominent non-Zionist, feared that the pronounced nationalism of the more outspoken Zionists would turn liberal opinion against American Jews and against American support for Palestine. “No one will look with favor on a repetition in Asia Minor of the situation in the Balkans. There are already enough instances known too well to the Jews, of one racial or cultural group seeking to dispossess the other, without adding the Jews to such predatory group.”35

The non-Zionists under Warburg’s leadership saw their immediate responsibility after the Palestine disturbances in providing relief.36 Based on his longstanding experience as head of the JJDC and supporting relief work in Europe, Warburg’s concern lay with the yishuv and the economic and social welfare of Palestine. Hoover, the engineer, shared this interest in progressive projects, and Hoover, the humanitarian, could relate to the Jewish suffering. As secretary of
commerce and as president, Hoover had expressed sympathy for the nation-building in Palestine, but his public and private statements did not endorse a Zionist state.

Lewis Strauss, as the chief’s loyal secretary and lifelong friend, brought Jewish issues and concerns before him and did everything in his capacity as a liaison to leaders of the American Jewish community to advance Hoover’s popularity with American Jews. Even after his presidency, Strauss continued to keep Hoover abreast of Jewish concerns. As early as 1933 Hoover the humanitarian deplored the situation of German Jews. While he failed to see the racial component in the antisemitism of Nazi Germany, the injustice against German Jews offended his strong beliefs in classic individualism: “It is not only the abhorrent bigotry of religious persecution that outrages every liberty-loving person, but the denial of common rights of men to earn their living, to conduct their businesses, and practice their professions.” In 1967 Strauss, by then a retired admiral, offered a postmortem appraisal of the chief’s racial attitudes: “He appreciated talent. He didn’t care whether the man who had it was of his political persuasion. He was absolutely color-blind as to race, and he didn’t care anything about denomination.”

Felix Warburg was a staunch supporter of the Republican Party and never lost his confidence in Hoover’s leadership ability or in the latter’s friendship for the Jews. When, in the wake of the 1929 riots, Hoover seemed reluctant and indifferent in the eyes of many American Zionists, others, primarily non-Zionists, concurred with the administration’s policy and saw the best course of action in unremitting support of U.S. policy and British action in Palestine.

It was not until 1932, when Hoover was in bad shape politically, that Strauss advised him to leave no stone unturned before election day and send a pro-Zionist message to the ZOA convention. Upon news that Democratic hopeful Franklin D. Roosevelt had announced his sympathy for a Jewish Palestine, Strauss thought it imperative that Hoover follow suit. Hoover’s pro-Zionist statement to the ZOA
celebrating the fifteenth anniversary of the Balfour Declaration was the only time the president referred to the 1922 congressional resolution that endorsed a Jewish national home in Palestine. Faced with relentless attacks on his character and presidency and in an attempt to increase his chances at the polls, Hoover was apparently finally ready to throw aside State Department concerns that the congressional resolution was neither a binding document nor a legitimate expression of U.S. foreign policy.39

But even a concerted effort by the National Republican Committee to increase Hoover’s popularity among Jews could not revive an already moribund campaign and avert the impending disappointment at the polls. Although articles like Edward Rosenblum’s “What Hoover has done for the Jews” again underscored Hoover’s exemplary record of humanitarianism and his personal interest in the Jews, a majority of Jews cast their vote for the Democratic ticket. Roosevelt had not made any special promises to American Jews, but as Max Rhoade, the ZOA lobbyist in Washington, put it, a Democratic administration was bound to continue the Wilson tradition with its strong commitment to the Balfour Declaration and the establishment of a Jewish national home. And though Roosevelt’s New Deal would launch a social revolution that turned many Jews from a low-prestige ethnic minority into an elite component of society, his support for Zionism and the establishment of a Jewish national home did not go beyond Hoover’s. After entering the White House, Roosevelt would downplay any such commitments and word his congratulatory messages to Zionists very carefully.40

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NOTES:
2. According to Evyatar Friesel, American Zionism specifically related to American Jewish conditions and developed in a new direction. He describes two trends that characterized the developments of American Zionism, the Americanization of the Zionist idea and the Zionization of American Jewry. The result, according to Friesel, was a Jewish community that did not negate the galut (exile)—so
central a component in European Zionism—because America was not galut, but the land of liberty, the “golden land.” Evyatar Friesel, “American Zionism and American Jewry: An Ideological and Communal Encounter,” American Jewish Archives 40, no. 1 (April 1988): 5–23; idem, “Brandeis’s Role in American Zionism Historically Reconsidered,” American Jewish History 69, no. 1 (September 1979): 34–59; idem, “The Influence of American Zionism on the American Jewish Community, 1900–1950,” American Jewish History 75, no. 1 (September 1985): 130–48; Maier Bryan Fox, American Zionism in the 1920s (Ph.D. diss., 1979); and Ben Halpern, “The Americanization of Zionism, 1880–1930,” American Jewish History 69, no. 1 (September 1979): 15–33. Allon Gal asserts that Zionism profoundly influenced American Jewish life, yet he concedes that while American Zionism conquered the community, it was conquered by it as well. Allon Gal, “The Zionist Influence on American Jewish Life,” American Jewish Archives 41, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 1989): 173–84; idem, “The Mission Motif in American Zionism (1898–1948),” American Jewish History 75, no. 4 (June 1986): 363–85; Naomi W. Cohen, American Jews and the Zionist Idea (New York: KTAV, 1975). Melvin I. Urofsky, “Zionism: An American Experience,” American Jewish Historical Quarterly 53, no. 3 (March 1974): 215–43. In The Emergence of American Zionism Mark A. Raider sees Labor Zionism as the key to the development and definition of American Zionism. In fact, he argues that Labor Zionism in the United States, “the voice of Labor Palestine on American soil, played a role disproportionate to its size in formulating the program and outlook of American Zionism.” (ix) In an attempt to draw a close connection between American Jews, Labor Zionism, and the yishuv, Raider overstates the significance of socialist Zionism in the American context. Stuart E. Rosenberg argues that the Zionism of American Jews was linked to their middle-class habits, reflecting the cultural attitude and condition of the American middle class. It is a very American middle-class phenomenon to have a penchant for “vicarious cultural atonement” in a materially affluent society. In this way, Rosenberg explains, Zionism became a new source of cultural pride. In supporting the development of Palestine as a Jewish homeland, Jews could indulge their American pride in a vicarious battle against Arab feudalism and the intransigence of the British mandatory government. And by the 1940s, when Zionism became more of a mass movement, it mirrored the mass mind of a middle-class community and avoided partisan ideologies that would commit its members to anything more than a general desire to rebuild the Jewish homeland. Political Zionism, Rosenberg argues, thus became benevolent Zionism, reflecting the values and condition of the middle class: “The success of American Zionism had much to do with the fact that it came to serve an important psychological function: it was the socially acceptable Jewish radical movement of the middle-class American Jew.” (78) Rosenberg, however, glosses over the bitter divisions within American Jewry over the nature of Zionism during the first decades of the twentieth century that made American Zionism much more complex. Stuart E. Rosenberg, The New Jewish Identity in America (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1985), 73–87. Rosenberg also makes the point that the Jewish immigrant to America came essentially from a middle-class background and thereby easily adapted to the middle-class culture of America. Irving Kristol further explains that the American Jewish proclivity for liberalism is again rooted in the fact that the majority of European Jewish immigrants came from Central and Eastern Europe, bringing with them the tradition and heritage of the continental radical liberalism of the French Revolution. He even goes so far to say that “Jewish political attitudes in the 1980s have a more

3. Feingold explains that American Zionism has to be understood against the backdrop of the fate of all ideologies in America “They are reshaped, emptied of their basic rationale and ‘praxis’ element, and remade into something that can fit. This happens whether the demand is to participate in the revolution and struggle for the ‘new day,’ to remain faithful to Torah and observe the Sabbath, or resettle in Zion. America does not offer an especially conducive atmosphere for ideologies. Its history is filled with empty shells of once passionately held beliefs as is its industrial landscape with obsolete red brick factories.” (167) Henry L. Feingold, “Assessing an Assessment: The Case for American Zionism,” *American Jewish History* 75, no. 1 (September 1985): 165–74; idem, *A Midrash on American Jewish History* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982); Stuart L. Rosenberg, *The New Jewish Identity in America* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1985); Robert M. Seltzer and Norman J. Cohen, eds., *The Americanization of the Jews* (New York: New York University Press, 1995).

4. Naomi W. Cohen, *The Year after the Riots: American Responses to the Palestine Riots of 1929–30* (Detroit: Wayne State University, 1988); Evyatar Friesel, “The Influence of American Zionism on the American Jewish Community, 1900-1950,” *American Jewish History* 75, no. 1 (September 1985): 130–58. Cohen acknowledges the fact that the American Jewish community during the 1920s was in disarray, the Zionist movement weak, and non-Zionism dominant among influential members of the Jewish community, but at the same time she holds the U.S. government to a higher plane of responsibility for not siding with Zionism and its aspirations for a Jewish national home. Friesel, an Israeli historian, criticizes the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) for its lack of organizational skill to mobilize the masses and to build on existing sympathies for the *yishuv* settlement. In the same vein, Cohen points to avenues the ZOA could and should have pursued to achieve better visibility and better results. Both historians devise their arguments from a position of hindsight. Looking to the cataclysmic events awaiting European Jewry in the 1930s and 1940s, both historians deplore the inability of the ZOA to bring Jewish concerns to the attention of government officials and the larger American public.

5. Ethnoracial theory draws a connection between policy and constituency pressure, often using the American Jewish community as an example of effective lobbying activity. However, a major shortcoming of ethnoracial theory becomes evident when analyzing the Jewish constituency during the interwar period. It tends to treat ethnic constituencies as if they were monolithic in their support of policy objectives that engage their interest. Given the complexity of the American Zionist movement in the 1920s and early 1930s, any attempt to generalize Jewish activism glosses over significant disunity and dissent within the Jewish community. Peter Y. Medding points out that prior to the advent of new Jewish politics—a fairly recent

6. Mark M Dodge, ed., Herbert Hoover and the Historians (West Branch: Herbert Hoover Presidential Library Association, 1989); Lee Nash, ed., Understanding Herbert Hoover: Ten Perspectives (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987); Joan Hoff Wilson, Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1975); Martin L. Fausold, ed., The Hoover Presidency: A Reappraisal (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1974); Martin L. Fausold, The Presidency of Herbert C. Hoover (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985); David Burner, Herbert Hoover: A Public Life (New York: Knopf, 1979); Herbert Hoover and the Republican Era: A Reconstruction, edited by Carl E. Krog and William R. Tanner (New York: University Press of America, 1984); Lloyd Craig, Aggressive Introvert: A Study of Herbert Hoover and Public Relations Management, 1912–32 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1972). Hoover's attitude on race, in particular his views on Jews, has not received much attention by Hoover biographers, and the overall consensus is not a favorable one. Although revisionist historians have successfully rehabilitated the damaged persona of Hoover by stressing his organizational genius in government efficiency and his humanitarian progressivism, the prevailing opinion of Hoover's racial views holds that he did not rise above the prejudice of his time. George F. Garcia, “Herbert Hoover and the Issue of Race,” The Annals of Iowa 44 (Winter 1979). Even Hooverphile Donald J. Lisio concedes that the chief’s encounter with racism is “the tragic yet instructive tale of a good man who insisted that he was color-blind but could not even see and understand the racism that engulfed him and his society.” Donald J. Lisio, Hoover, Blacks, and Lily-Whites: A Study of Southern Strategies (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 282. Lisio convincingly explains how Hoover’s southern strategy turned into a public relations disaster. Although Hoover was genuinely intent on helping blacks, his short-term vision of clean and efficient government in the southern states destroyed his long-term objective of permanent political, economic, and racial progress. Advised by his cohorts to adopt a policy of silence on matters relating to race, Hoover not only alienated the leadership of black Republicans, but he failed to satisfy the white elite in the South as well.


10. Marshall to Weizmann, June 6, 1929, Folder 6, Box 9, Louis Marshall Papers, AJA.

11. Based on data taken from Samuel Halperin, *The Political World of American Zionism* (Silver Spring, Md., 1985), 327, in the late 1920s and early 1930s the American Zionist movement comprised 63,859 individuals. The Jewish population of the United States was estimated at 4.2 million people at the time. Between 1929 and 1933 the ZOA experienced a drop in membership of more than 50 percent.

12. One of the partners of the investment firm Kuhn, Loeb & Co was Felix Warburg, philanthropist and head of the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee.


14. Yehuda Bauer, *My Brother’s Keeper: A History of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, 1929–39* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1974); Harriet Loewenstein, comptroller and overseas secretary of Joint Distribution Committee, to Herbert Hoover, head of the Supreme Economic Council, July 30, 1919, “American Fund for Jewish War Sufferers 1919,” Pre-Commerce Papers Subject File, HHPL; Royal Victor to Christian Herter, secretary to Herbert Hoover. August 22, 1921, “Joint Distribution Committee, 1921–22,” Commerce Papers, HHPL. Strauss reported that when news reached the chief in the spring of 1919 that Polish troops had captured the city of Pinsk and machine-gunned thirty-seven local Jews for alleged Communist sympathies, Hoover was the one to take immediate action. He summoned Polish Prime Minister Ignace Jan Paderewski to an interview at which Hoover underscored the demand to conduct a vigorous investigation into the Pinsk
affair. But despite Hoover's action and protests in New York, organized by Felix Warburg, the Polish army continued to attack Jews in the cities it occupied. Strauss persuaded Hoover to propose the idea to President Wilson of a special commission charged to look into the matter. As a result, a three-man American commission traveled to Poland and remained there for two months of observation. By 1920 conditions in Poland had improved, the ARA continued to supply food in generous quantities, and Jews could rest more easily, at least temporarily. Documents of the American Relief Administration: European Operations, 1918-22, vol. 18: Poland, Pre-Commerce Papers, HHPL; Pfau, No Sacrifice Too Great, 23–27. Lewis L. Strauss, “Herbert C. Hoover and the Jews of Eastern Europe,” American Hebrew (April 23, 1920).


16. Felix M. Warburg to Lewis Strauss, November 7, 1928, “Politics,” Felix M. Warburg Papers, AJA. “I am sure that you are proud and thrilled as I am that our chief is now the nation's chief. Please convey to him and Mrs. Hoover my warmest good wishes. It seems wonderful that our dream has come true.”


18. Although truly convinced that Hoover was the right man for the job of the presidency, Marshall was not blind to the realities of Jewish political allegiance. He pointed to the stark contrast that existed between the two parties when it came to Jewish concerns such as immigration or Jewish appointments to public service positions. Louis Marshall to Lewis Strauss, July 26, 1928, “Louis Marshall,” Lewis L. Strauss Papers, Name and Subject File I, HHPL. In the presidential election of 1928 Jews gave the Democratic candidate Al Smith 72 percent of their vote. Henry L. Feingold, “From Equality to Liberty: The Changing Political Culture of American Jews,” in The Americanization of the Jews, edited by Robert M. Seltzer and Norman J. Cohen, 104.


20. Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab, and British Policies, published for the Esco

21. Unable to secure a sympathetic response from the State Department, the American Zionists had begun to lobby for a congressional endorsement of their program. Rabbi Simon Glazer of Kansas City, who knew a number of senators, had convinced several of them that it would be politically beneficial for them to support the idea of a Jewish national homeland. Consequently, Senator Henry C. Lodge of Massachusetts and Representative Hamilton Fish of New York introduced resolutions of support in the spring of 1922, and both houses of Congress started hearings on the subject. The New York Times, whose owners opposed Jewish nationalism, attacked the resolutions, and charged that Lodge’s upcoming reelection campaign had more to do with his sudden interest in Zionism than any altruistic interest on behalf of a Jewish national home. At the time, the members of Congress saw little harm in the resolutions and expected much political advantage. As recent as 1921 Congress had antagonized a number of ethnic groups in establishing immigration restrictions. By supporting resolutions that endorsed Zionist demands, they could at least make partial amends to one of the groups affected by the new immigration quotas. Thinking primarily in terms of domestic politics, these congressmen gave little consideration to what kind of consequences such a statement could have on foreign policy. See Urofsky, American Zionism from Herzl to the Holocaust, 308; America and Palestine: The Attitude of Official America and of the American People toward the Rebuilding of Palestine as a Free and Democratic Jewish Commonwealth, edited by Reuben Fink (New York: Herald Square Press, Inc., 1945), 41–43.


25. Warburg assumed leadership of the Administrative Committee after Louis Marshall’s death in 1929, shortly after the creation of the Enlarged Jewish Agency, called the “pact of glory” between Zionists and non-Zionists.


27. Morris Waldman, secretary of AJC, to Julius Rosenwald, August 28, 1929, “American Jewish Committee—Correspondence,” Admiral Lewis L Strauss Papers, AJHS.

28. Morris Waldman to Judge Elkus, August 29, 1929, “American Jewish Committee—Correspondence,” Admiral Lewis L Strauss Papers, AJHS. Morris Waldman, Announcement to the American Jewish Committee Members, “American Jewish Committee—Correspondence,” Admiral Lewis L. Strauss Papers, AJHS.

29. Moses A. Leavitt to Dr. Adler, September 1, 1929, “American Jewish Committee—Correspondence,” Admiral Lewis L Strauss Papers, AJHS. In a letter to Dr. Adler, September 3, 1929, “American Jewish Committee—Correspondence,” Admiral Lewis L. Strauss Papers, AJHS. Waldman wrote that “in spite of reported restiveness on the Palestinian frontiers, the situation in the Holy Land appears to be fairly well in hand. There appears to be less warrant for direct action on the part of our government than a week ago.”


31. Felix Warburg to Lewis L. Strauss, August 29, 1929, “Felix Warburg,” Lewis L. Strauss Papers, Name and Subject File I, HHPL.

32. Chaim Weizmann to Felix Warburg, September 24, 1929, “Zionist Organization of America,” Felix M. Warburg Papers, AJA. According to Warburg, the meeting between the American Jewish delegation and the British prime minister was very pleasant and sympathetic. See Minutes of Conference of American Deportation
of the Jewish Agency for Palestine with Prime Minister James R. MacDonald, October 11, 1929, “Jewish Agency for Palestine,” Felix M. Warburg Papers, AJA.


34. Warburg to Sir Melchett, November 11, 1929, “Palestine,” Felix M. Warburg Papers, AJA.


37. Herbert Hoover to Lewis Strauss, July 5, 1933, Admiral Lewis L. Strauss Papers, Name and Subject File I, HHPL.


39. Strauss commented that the president’s message to the ZOA was distinctly better than Roosevelt’s. Lewis Strauss to French Strother, secretary to the president, October 17, 1932, “Correspondence, Herbert C. Hoover,” Admiral Lewis L. Strauss Papers, AJHS; W. N. Doak to Lawrence Richey, July 28, 1932, “Edward Rosenblum, 1932,” E. French Strother Papers, HHPL.

Mediaeval Jewish travelers have left records of Jewish communities, and there is evidence of the existence of Jewish agricultural communities, perhaps from the days of the Temple. In the seventeenth century, the illustrious Don Joseph Nasi and his mother conceived the idea of planting Jews on the soil of Palestine. The big political schemes for a Jewish Palestine in the eighteen-forties, whether conceived by Gentile or conceived by Jew, were based upon the rule of Mehemet Ali over Syria and Palestine. The great Powers, in bringing about the fall of Mehemet Ali, sterilized all these projects. When the United States was neutral, and the American Jews had access to the East, they promptly assumed the responsibility which had fallen upon them. Various leaders of the American Jewish community supported the Hoover administration’s cautious course of action. Henry Rose of the National News Service notified Hoover that he had mailed an announcement throughout the United States regarding the situation in Palestine, calling for a halt of criticism directed against the administration. While the Palestine disturbances awakened American Zionism to an increased commitment toward a Jewish national home in Palestine, criticizing the British inability to quell the riots and demanding U.S. intervention, leaders of the non-Zionist German-Jewish es