CONSTRUCTING A HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY FOREIGN RELATIONS

by Michael H. Hunt

The study of the foreign relations of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is undergoing dramatic changes that are taking it in a distinctly more historical direction. This development has essentially been driven by the appearance of an abundance of new material (for details see the accompanying essay on sources). This material is largely the product of the party's own history establishment and its mandate to transcend a simple and largely discredited party mythology in favor of a better documented and hence more credible past. The publication of documents, memoirs, chronologies, and standard historical accounts has at last made it possible for specialists outside of China to move beyond broad, heavily speculative treatments based on fragmentary evidence and to construct a party foreign-policy history marked by engaging human detail and structural complexity.

My book, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), is itself a good gauge of that already well advanced if uneven reorientation. As is evident in the volume, the historical ground becomes more treacherous to traverse the closer we get to the present. The prehistory of the CCP (located in the opening chapters of my study in the late Qing and the early Republic) is firmly in place. From the point of the CCP’s formal founding in 1921 down to its consolidation of state power in 1949-1950 (the subject of the middle chapters), the evidence constitutes uneven footing that requires some caution. The most recent phase—the foreign relations of the party-state—is just beginning to pass into the historical realm (as the tentativeness of the relevant chapter suggests). It will prove the most interpretively volatile as historical patterns begin to emerge for the first time from the accumulation of reliable evidence.

This trend toward a more historical treatment of the CCP’s external relations has occurred at an uneven pace and taken different forms in a field effectively fragmented into two distinct parts. The work done in China is already decidedly historical though still politically constrained. Outside of China (largely but by no means exclusively in the United States), scholarship bears the imprint of the political science discipline and the closely related international relations field, which has long dominated CCP foreign-policy studies. Historical questions and historical methods are thus, at least outside of China, only beginning to move from the margins to a more central position.

The purpose of this article is to offer a guide to this emergent historical approach. It begins with an extended look at the field’s two chief geographic divisions, China and the United States. It closes with some thoughts on ways to encourage the already promising prospects for a solidly grounded and conceptually sophisticated history of party foreign relations.

Scholarship in China

Scholars in the People’s Republic of China, now in many ways at the leading edge of CCP foreign-policy history, have only recently come into their own. They long labored under the gaze of party representatives whose main task was to ensure that history served the party’s political agenda and contributed to nationalist myths and popular morale during the international crises that marked Mao Zedong’s years of power. Under these difficult conditions specialists on Chinese foreign relations did their best work by putting together politically inoffensive collections of historical materials, many of notable quality and lasting value. But in their own writing they had to serve up a thin historical gruel heavily spiced but hardly made more palatable by quotes from Chairman Mao and other sources of the official orthodoxy. This revolutionary historiography, following tenets laid down by Mao, stressed the wave of imperialism that had overpowered China. Commercial and later industrial capitalism, its diplomatic agents, and those Chinese drawn into the unsavory role of collaborator, had left the Chinese people impoverished, economically subordinated, and politically in thrall. The predatory character of imperialism locked China in fundamental conflict with the powers until a popular revolution transformed China and altered China’s relationship to the capitalist world.

Since the late 1970s established scholars have worked free of many of the old interpretative constraints, and joined by a younger, adventuresome generation have begun to exploit their inherent advantages in studying China’s complex behavior in an often threatening and generally intrusive world. They have had immediate access to publications (some of limited circulation), and enjoyed the first glimpses into the archives. They have profited from their personal contacts with former policymakers, and brought to new sources an unmatched sensitivity to the political culture in which China’s policy was made. They have enjoyed the stimulus of a large and interested audience for their writing and easy opportunity to discuss with colleagues work in progress and news of the field. As a result of these developments, the center for the study of foreign relations and the CCP has shifted back to China. A glance at the number of specialists and special research offices, the frequency of conferences, and the long list of publications would all confirm this impression.

But Chinese specialists still face some notable difficulties. One of these is a patriotism that the CCP did not create but did powerfully reinforce in scholarship as in other realms of Chinese life. The mantra is familiar: China was divided and oppressed; China pulled itself together under CCP leadership; China stood up. This satisfying if somewhat simple story to which specialists on party history and foreign relations still give at least lip service constrains their examination of foreign relations, not least with the capitalist powers and inner-Asian peoples. These sensitive topics must be addressed correctly and carefully or not at all.

While the fate of non-Han people under China’s imperial ambitions are simply written out of the category of foreign relations (to be treated instead as an “internal” matter), dealings with foreign powers are featured in terms of the comfortable and safe tale of struggle and triumph. For example, PRC scholars enjoying unparalleled access to source materials on the Korean conflict waged against a U.S.-led coalition have been in a position to offer the fullest account of its conduct, warts and all. Their accounts are indeed fuller but the warts are hard to spot, thus keeping alive the old heroic narrative. Patriotism, reinforced by party orthodoxy, has inspired repeated claims that the Korean intervention was a “brilliant decision” unblemished by confu-
sion, division, or opportunism. That very phrase appears in the title of one of the earliest of the documented accounts to appear in the PRC, and the theme persists in virtually all of the secondary studies of the Korean War published in the last decade. 2

A second impulse, as constraining as patriotism and no less intrusive, has been the pressure to fit research findings within a linear, progressive conception of the CCP’s development. Highly self-conscious of the importance of its own past to legitimizing the current leadership and maintaining party prestige, the CCP has consistently sought to explain its evolution in terms of the forces of history and the wisdom of its leaders. The result is a picture of a party that adjusted to changing social and international conditions and that consistently and correctly reassessed its own performance, distinguishing correct from mistaken policy lines. The party, thus at least in theory, developed according to a logic which left scant room for recurrent miscalculation or fundamental misdirection.

This notion of history in which all events are mere tributaries feeding the mainstream itself flowing toward some predestined point is extraordinarily constraining, as a look at PRC writings relating the 1919 May Fourth movement to the CCP reveals. Chinese leaders interested in the origins of the party have tried to force a rich set of contemporary views into an orthodox framework wherein the raison d’être of May Fourth is to serve as intellectual midwife to the CCP’s birth. Their studies make the Bolshevik revolution the central and transformative event in the intellectual life of future party leaders; they underestimate that era’s ideological exploration and fluidity; they minimize attachment to such heterodox beliefs as anarchism; and they downplay the influence of earlier personal concerns and indigenous political ideas. 3

The third obstacle in the way of party historians is the sensitivity with which the party center continues to regard past relations with “fraternal” parties. This reticence is perhaps understandable in the case of North Korea and Vietnam. A candid look at the past can complicate dealings with parties still in power. But the reticence applies even to the now defunct Soviet party. By thus consigning interparty relations to historical limbo, the CCP has effectively set out of bounds large and important slices of its own foreign-relations record and experience. How the CCP privately assessed the USSR as a supporter and model—surely the single most important issue for understanding the CCP’s position within the socialist camp—will remain a matter of speculation if not controversy so long as the historical sources needed to arbitrate it are kept locked in Chinese archives and excluded even from restricted-circulation materials. The opening of Soviet archives may provide the first revealing, detailed picture of broad aspects of the relationship, and may perhaps even help overcome some of the squeamishness party leaders apparently feel about a candid look at this important part of their own past. Or it may take the passing of the last of party elders whose memories of dealing with the Soviets go back to the 1920s. However they get there, scholars badly need freer rein to research and publish on this long sensitive topic vital to understanding the CCP after 1949 no less than before that date. [Ed. note: A sampling of recently released Chinese materials on Sino-Soviet relations, 1956-58, appears on pages 148-163 of this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.]

The last and easily the most practical problem handed down from earlier CCP historical work is the matter of the layers of tendentious documentation and personal reminiscences that have come to surround Mao Zedong. Those layers have unfortunately not only served to obscure him as a personality and policymaker but also covered over the contributions of his colleagues. Repeatedly over the last half century party officials have remade Mao, re-creating his persona to suit the politics of the times. These multiple layers baffle and distract foreign scholars no less than Chinese.

The process began in the late 1930s when the task was to reinforce Mao’s claims to leadership of the party. Mao himself made a signal contribution by relating his autobiography to Edgar Snow in mid-1936. Putting aside the reticence usually so marked a feature of Chinese autobiography, Mao offered a self-portrait that highlighted his own moment of Marxist illumination and his strong revolutionary commitment. The resulting account bears an uncanny resemblance to the genre of spiritual autobiography penned by Buddhist and Confucian writers intent on making their own journeys of spiritual self-transformation and spiritual discovery available for the edification of others. 4

But Mao’s account also arose from the more practical political concern with launching a publicity campaign that would win support for the party among Chinese and foreigners and bring in much needed contributions from the outside. Inviting Snow, a reliably progressive American, to Bao’an was part of that strategy. Mao set aside roughly two hours a night over ten evenings to tell his story. While Wu Liping translated, Snow took notes. Huang Hua then translated those notes back into Chinese for Mao to review. Snow then returned to Beijing to prepare the final account, to appear in 1938 in Red Star over China. The first Chinese version of Mao’s story appeared the year before. That Chinese edition and others would circulate within Nationalist as well as CCP controlled areas. 5

The second layer is associated with the “new democracy” Mao began to form in the wake of Wang Ming’s defeat and in the context of the rectification movement of 1942-1943. 6 Party theoreticians had in 1941 begun to promote the importance of “Mao thought” to party orthodoxy, and a Political Bureau meeting in September and October of that year produced statements of support from Wang Jiaxiang, Zhang Wentian, Chen Yun, and Ye Jianying. (Neither Zhou Enlai nor Lin Biao was present.) For the next two years the visibility of “Mao thought” continued to rise. Zhang Ruxin, Zhu De, Chen Yun, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai offered praise, and Mao’s writings figured prominently in the study material used in the rectification campaign. The Seventh Party Congress brought the apotheosis. A Liu Shaoqi report and a resolution passed at the congress established a Maoist historiography and proclaimed the guiding role of “Mao thought.”

As early as mid-1944 the first genuine collection of Mao’s writings had appeared to help consolidate his claim to ideological dominance within the CCP. This early five-volume Mao Zedong xuanji [Selected Works of Mao Zedong] was edited under Wang Jiaxiang’s supervision and published in the Jin-Cha-Ji base area by the New China News Agency. New editions of his selected works (perhaps as many as eight, some with restricted circulation) continued to appear in the base areas down to 1948. That same year Xiao San published his account of the young Mao; he had conceived the project nearly a
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The third layer of Mao publications began to appear soon after the conquest of power in 1949. Stalin is supposed to have suggested to Mao during their Moscow summit the formal designation of an official body of Mao’s writings. [Ed. note: The Soviet transcript of the first Stalin-Mao meeting, on 16 December 1949, published on pages 5-7 of this issue of the Bulletin, indicates that Mao, not Stalin, made this suggestion.] The Political Bureau gave its approval in spring 1950, and a compilation committee was formed at once. The resulting four volumes of this new xuanji, published between 1952 and 1960, burnedish the image of the statesman traveling the Chinese road to socialism. This new collection, carefully revised by Mao with the help of his staff, was flanked by yet another treatment of the young revolutionary, this one by Li Rui.8

The next layer in the official Mao was laid down during the Cultural Revolution. Alarmed by what he saw as ideological backsliding in the USSR and the persistent bourgeois grip on China’s intellectual and cultural life, Mao put forward his own ideas as the antidote. His acolytes took up the struggle, beginning with compilation of the “Little Red Book” on the eve of the Cultural Revolution. That slim but ever-present volume was but the herald to twenty-plus collections intended to define the most imposing Mao ever—“the greatest genius in the world,” unsurpassed “in several hundred years in the world and in several thousand years in China.” One enthusiast declared, “Chairman Mao stands much higher than Marx, Engels, Lenin, or Stalin.” His thought “serves as the lighthouse for mankind,” its “universal truth applicable everywhere.”9

The latest layer took form soon after Mao’s death and was shaped by the political struggle to claim his legacy and appraise his achievements. Hua Guofeng sought to strengthen his claim to leadership through the editing of volume five of the official xuanji, published in 1977. The other, ultimately victorious side in the succession struggle dismissed the tendentious quality of that volume and went off in search of its own Mao. The new image, intended to serve the political program of Deng Xiaoping and his allies, was defined after two years and considerable Political Bureau discussion. The resulting 1981 resolution, prepared by a small drafting group headed by Hu Qiaomu and supervised by Deng himself along with Hu Yaobang, made Mao bear the burden of mistakes committed in his last years, forced him to share credit for the successes with his colleagues, but let him retain full credit for his earlier revolutionary leadership. Finally, in 1986 a two-volume reader appeared defining the essence of this latest, emphatically scientific version of “Mao thought.”10

In the new atmosphere of greater openness the party history establishment has made available a wide range of works that constitute the point of departure for anyone interested in Mao’s outlook and political role. But cutting through the successive layers of Mao documentation and sorting through the mountain of writing that he left behind is a task that Chinese scholars have sidestepped. Without comment, they have let new scholarly collections pile up on top of the older ones compiled with a marked political agenda, leaving specialists outside China such as Takeuchi Minoru, Stuart R. Schram, Michael Y. M. Kau, and John K. Leung struggling to produce a full and accurate collection essential to recovering the historical figure beneath all the political mythmaking.

A variety of other difficulties stand in the way of the development of party history in its homeland. The publications process lacks quality controls, in part because there are so many party history journals with pages to fill and so many party elders with reputations to burnish, causes to advance, and scores to even. Access to archives for the entire history of the Communist Party and for the era of the PRC is tightly restricted. Some favored Chinese specialists get in; foreigners are uniformly excluded. Even the best libraries are weak on international studies generally and on the foreign relations of particular countries whose histories impinged on that of China. Opportunities are limited for research in libraries and archives outside China and for exposure to conceptual approaches prevailing abroad.

As a result, party historians in China operate in an atmosphere of caution and insularity. There is little if any interest in methodological or theoretical issues so prominent outside of China. Scholarly debates do not publicly at least go beyond brief exchanges in party history journals over such factual questions as the date of a particular document or the contents of a particular conversation. Engrossed in a clearly defined body of party history materials, researchers pay scant attention to either Chinese society or the international environment in which the CCP operated. The failure to read, not to mention engage, foreign scholarship has helped preserve the narrowness, discourage international dialogue, and close off CCP history from comparative insights.

Behind at least some of these difficulties is something that is likely to be in short supply for the foreseeable future—material resources for research and the assurance that researchers have political support or at least tolerance from a ruling party concerned to keep its historical reputation free of blemish. An attempt to circumvent these two problems by sending Chinese abroad for graduate study in history and international relations has proven somewhat disappointing. It is my impression that those studying overseas in one or another of the broad foreign-relations fields have not found training and research on China-related topics notably attractive, and dismaying few of those who have completed their studies abroad have gone home to share their skills, knowledge, and contacts. Long-time expatriates are likely to find settling into home institutions trying and particularly frustrating after having paid a substantial personal price in making the earlier adjustment to foreign academic life.

Despite all these problems, good work on CCP foreign relations is being done in China that bears considerable relevance to historical scholarship in the United States and elsewhere abroad. Indeed, it has already had an impact here, thanks above all to the PRC scholars who have helped foreigners researching in China, who have published in English, or who have begun careers in the American university system. It seems certain that foreign historians bent on studying the CCP will ride on the coat-tails and in many cases work in close cooperation with the larger and more active group of Chinese scholars.

Scholarship in the United States

On this side of the Pacific, historical work on CCP foreign relations has suffered from neglect. In the most direct sense this state of affairs is the result of indifference to
the subject by historians of modern China. The paucity at least until recently of adequate sources provides the most obvious explanation for this indifference. But perhaps even more important is the fall of foreign relations from historical grace—from the position of prominence and respect it once enjoyed. As historians embraced a “China-centered” approach, they became increasingly absorbed in intellectual, social, economic, and local history. They looked back with a critical eye on the earlier historical literature with its strong emphasis on China’s external relations, and they saw scant reason for interest in more recent treatments of CCP foreign policy produced in the main by political scientists.11

As a result, an emergent CCP foreign-policy history, like other aspects of China’s foreign relations, stands somewhat apart from today’s governing historical concerns. Why should specialists in early twentieth-century anarchism, urban women, or rural society care about the party’s dealings with the outside world? Even specialists in party history drawn from a new generation of American historians are inclined to set foreign relations beyond their purview or banish it at best to the margins of their concerns.

But arguably to set foreign relations somewhere on edge of Chinese history is to impoverish both. Politics and the state do matter, a point that social and cultural historians in a variety of fields have come to accept.12 And foreign policy, the regulation of relations with the outside world, may be one of the most powerful and consequential aspects of the state’s activity. Understanding the decisions, institutions, and culture associated with that activity can be of signal importance in filling out such diverse topics as the role of ideas, life in the city, or changes in the countryside. Party historians in particular run the risk of losing track of the global dimensions of the revolutionary and state-building enterprise and thereby forfeiting a chance to move toward a fully rounded understanding of the CCP. At the same time, CCP foreign relations needs the methodological levenging and interpretive breadth afforded by the history of China as it is now practiced. Foreign relations also needs the well honed language tools that historians of China could bring to mining the documentary ore now so abundantly in view.

While there is no reason to mourn the passing of the age of foreign-relations hegemony in the study of the Chinese past, the effect has been to leave the stewardship of China’s foreign relations to political scien-

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This article offers a general overview of the literature on the origins and evolution of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP)’s external relations. This opportunity to share with interested readers my understanding of that literature also permits me to acknowledge the scholarly contributions of others who made my synthesis in The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy possible.

**Background and General Treatments**

Anyone in search of major themes in Chinese foreign relations or a ready overview should start with Jonathan Spence’s elegant The Search for Modern China (New York: Norton, 1990), and The Cambridge History of China, general editors Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge University Press, 1978– ). The Cambridge History provides good coverage not only of the period treated in this study—the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—but also earlier times. Both Spence and The Cambridge History volumes offer help on the relevant literature.

Of all the broad-gauge surveys of CCP external relations, John Gittings’ s The World and China, 1922-1972 (New York: Harper and Row, 1974) stands out for the vigor of its argument and for the breadth of its concep-
tists with their own understandably distinct agenda and style. The consequence of their dominance is a literature tending in two directions, each bearing features that are worrisome because of the effect they may have in slowing and skewing the use of new materials on the CCP.13

One tendency, marked but by no means dominant, is a preoccupation with theoretical abstractions. What may most strike historians is how this theory-building enterprise tends to thrive under conditions that are euphemistically described by those who attempt it as “data poor” (if imagination rich). We can all call to mind efforts to construct and test high-flying theoretical formulations that get off the ground only after the perilous potholes along the evidentiary runway are carefully smoothed over. Once airborne, those formulations stay aloft only so long as no dangerous mountains of data intrude in the flight path. The virtuosity of the performance can be impressive, but it usually comes at the price of obscuring the fascinating complexity of political life with sometimes mind-numbing abstractions.14

The second, perhaps more pronounced tendency among political scientists is to approach Chinese policy with a stronger commitment to description and a more developed historical sensibility. Political scientists working along these lines bring to their work an awareness of the way that skimpy documentation hobbles their interpretive effort. This group also follows an old-fashioned faith in the importance of individual leaders’ values, style, and personality—especially Mao’s.15 But the paucity of good documentation long locked CCP decisionmaking in a black box and forced these China-watchers to find modes of analysis that would help them make sense of limited evidence and communicate their findings promptly and clearly to the broad policy community. Determined to make some sense of what was going on inside the black box, these analysts developed a variety of tools to penetrate its mysteries. However, the problematic nature of some of those tools is becoming apparent as the new CCP sources open up that box for the first time and permit comparison of past interpretations with the newer, more richly documented understanding.

The reading of public pronouncements, long a mainstay of China-watchers, is rendered particularly tricky by all the ways those pronouncements can deceive. Usually couched in explicit and correct ideological terms, they may not reflect the more direct, less jargon-ridden inner-party discussions and directives. They are, moreover, sometimes intended to manipulate outsiders, and thus are couched in terms that the party thinks will be effective on its target audience, not in terms that are revealing of inner-party calculations. Finally, they may be directed at an audience altogether different from the one the contemporary foreign reader may have assumed was the target.16

American observers’ misreading of the CCP’s propaganda line from mid-1945 to mid-1946 offers a good example of these interpretive difficulties. Inner-party documents now capture Mao Zedong as a back-stage operator, carefully orchestrating an attempt to manipulate Washington into an engagement in Chinese politics beneficial to the CCP. He was not intent, as most students of the period have naturally concluded on the basis of the public record, on dismissing American contacts or rejecting American involvement.17

An even more complicated example of the perils of reading public signals is Zhou Enlai’s interview on 3 October 1950 with the Indian ambassador. Often cited retrospectively as one of a string of crystal-clear warnings issued by Beijing following the outbreak of the Korean War, Zhou’s own language in the formal Chinese record is in fact strikingly muffled and vague and does not accurately convey the depth of Mao’s commitment to intervention at that moment. Zhou was apparently aware that he might be misconstrued and worked with his translator to get his point across. But U.S. China-watchers in Hong Kong had difficulty extracting a clear message from that October interview, and the puzzle still remains for historians today looking back. While we may puzzle over whether Zhou’s lack of clarity was inadvertent or by design, the point remains that this critical public pronouncement is still hard to interpret.18

An emphasis on factions, the relatively stable groups united by some sort of overarching interest or ideology,19 is another of the questionable short-cuts employed by China-watchers struggling to make sense of Beijing politics. The reduction of complicated political choices to stark factional alternatives reflected the analysts’ need for clarity and the absence of restraints that rich documentation might impose. At first based largely on circumstantial evidence, the factional interpretation enjoyed a major boost during the Cultural Revolution when material on elite conflict became public. As a result, a variety of factional cleavages have gained prominence in the writing of China-watchers, and soon found their way back into the work on party history produced by political scientists. Perhaps the best known of the factional interpretations has arrayed “Maoists” against Moscow-oriented “internationalists.”20

The new materials have raised two sets of doubts about the factional model. On the one hand, they offer little to support even a circumstantial argument for the existence of factions, and on the other they have set in question the Cultural Revolution evidence used to beat down former party leaders. Some of this evidence is of doubtful authenticity, and much seems torn from context to score political points.

It would prove ironic indeed if the factional model turns out to offer a no more subtle treatment of Chinese politics than does the former dependence of the CCP’s own analysts on struggles within monopoly capitalism to explain U.S. politics. Undeniably, informal networks and shifting coalitions have played a part in PRC politics, but a compelling, carefully documented case has not yet been made that those networks have supported stable and identifiable as opposed to complex and cross-cutting political attachments. Scholars pressing factional claims bear the responsibility for being explicit about their definition of the term, marshalling reliable evidence, and setting whatever factional activity may exist within the broad political context so as to clarify the relative importance of such activity.

A final shortcut rendered doubtful by the new CCP history is the China-watchers’ reliance on China’s own international affairs “experts” as a prime source of information.21 These experts, often accessible and able to speak the language (both literally and figuratively) of Western analysts, have become over the past decade understandably attractive contacts, constituting along with their foreign counterparts a transnational community of policy specialists and commentators on current international affairs.

But the new history underlines the limited insights of these experts by revealing...
the degree to which decisionmaking on critical issues has been closely held, the monopoly of a handful of leaders. Moreover, the new history reveals that major decisions have often been tightly guarded, not something to share with a foreigner—except where it suits the purposes of the party center to make available partial and sometimes tendentious information.

The shift toward a more historical rendering of the CCP past should have a notable impact on political science research. Those of a more descriptive bent should welcome and benefit from the accumulation of fresh evidence that makes possible greater analytic rigor and sharper interpretive insight. The more theoretically inclined may be the more threatened, but some will accommodate to the new data, using it as ballast that will keep them closer to the safety of the ground. Indeed, it is possible that taking a longer view and looking at the implications of better documented cases may induce them to dispense with all but the most modest, commonsensical “theory” and perhaps even to enter the fray over what the evidence actually means. The theoretically enthralled may thereby rediscover in Chinese policy some of the classic and “soft” issues of international politics—the importance of personality, the contingent nature of politics, the complexity of thought behind action, and the persistence and power of political culture.

While this new CCP history should give political scientists pause, they also have important contributions to make to a more historically oriented field. Their concern with understanding the state and explaining its exercise of power has generated a repertoire of theories that may prove helpful to anyone trying to make sense of considerable new data and still uncertain of the most fruitful way to frame the issues. Moreover, the political scientists’ preoccupation with contemporary questions stands as a salutary reminder to the more historically oriented of the complex relationship of past to present—of how the present may subtly influence the agenda for historical research and how historical findings may illuminate current problems.

Defining a Historical Agenda

CCP foreign policy is, as the above discussion suggests, a field distinctly in flux. Specialists have put a good deal of time and energy into coping with the recent flood of valuable documentary and other materials. The flood may be cresting, and those who have escaped drowning and reached the safety of high ground are now in a position to reflect on their future tasks.

The most obvious is to link a better documented version of CCP external relations chronologically and thematically to Chinese foreign relations in general. Qing sources, printed and archival, have long been available, and have been recently reinforced by the opening of collections located in the PRC. Materials from the Republican era get

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**CCP LEADERS’ SELECTED WORKS AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION**

**By Chen Jian**

The study of 20th-century Chinese history, especially the history of the Chinese Communist revolution, has experienced a boom in the late 1980s and early 1990s largely for two reasons. First, the introduction of the “reform and opening to the outside world” policy in the People’s Republic of China in the late 1970s and early 1980s resulted in a more flexible political and academic environment, which enabled Chinese scholars, historians in particular, to conduct their studies in more creative and critical ways. Second, the release of many previous unavailable documentary sources about the activities of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) makes it possible for scholars, both in China and in the West, to base their studies on a more comprehensive documentary foundation. This paper reviews the works of CCP leaders that have been compiled and published (both internally and openly) since the early 1980s, examining their influence on the historical writing of the Chinese Communist revolution.

**I**

For the purpose of mobilizing the party’s rank and file as well as the masses, the CCP has long carried out a practice of compiling and publishing the works of Party leaders. The most important example in this regard is the publication of the four-volume *Mao Zedong xuanji* (Selected Works of Mao Zedong) in the 1950s and 1960s. Altogether, over 100,000,000 sets of *xuanji* had been printed and sold by 1966–1967, making them, together with the famous “little red book” (*Quotations of Chairman Mao*), the “Red Bible” during the years of the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.” (As a by-product, Chairman Mao became the richest person in China from royalty income, although, according to the memoirs of his nurses and bodyguards, he disliked money and was unwilling to touch it himself.) The publication of works of the CCP leaders was not designed to provide scholars with reliable source materials to study the party’s past; rather, it was aimed to guide the revolutionary mass movement into the orbit set up by the party.

Thus, the criteria for selecting the works of Party leaders followed the Party’s needs. Indeed, only those documents which served to promote the Party’s current policy, or to enhance the Party’s and its leaders’ image of being “eternally correct,” were made public. Consequently, the selection process often resulted in a substantive revision of the texts of historical documents. For example, it is well known among China scholars that the texts of many pieces in *Mao Zedong xuanji* were substantially altered from the original versions.

Yet scholars of the Chinese revolution, including historians, have widely used such publications as *Mao Zedong xuanji* as their primary sources. Indeed, at a time that Western scholars had to travel to Hong Kong, Taipei, and Tokyo to collect materials on the Chinese Communist revolution, how could they exclude *Mao Zedong xuanji* from their data base? The openly published selected works by CCP leaders, together with official CCP statements, contemporaneous newspapers and journal literature, and, in some cases, Guomindang (Nationalist Party) and Western intelligence reports, formed the documentary basis of Western studies on the Chinese Communist revolution before the early 1980s. Sometimes China scholars had no choice but to rely on obviously flawed documentary sources. As a result, in those years, the ability to make good “educated guesses” was a necessary quality for every Western scholar writing about China.

**II**

In a brief sketch, it is hard to describe...
steadily better as fresh publications appear and archives open on Taiwan and within the PRC. The new CCP material helps round out an already rich documentary base and makes all the more urgent an integrated treatment of China’s external relations. Drawing on this range of sources, historians can begin to offer in-depth treatment of all the kinds of topics associated with a well developed foreign-relations literature—from important personalities to the relation of policy to the “public.” It should also convey a more complex sense of policy with features—economic opportunism, political flexibility, cultural ambivalence, strategic opportunism, and policy confusion—long associated with the better studied policies of other countries. To bring these themes into better focus specialists will want to place the CCP’s historical experience in a comparative framework and look for insight on the CCP that might emerge from juxtaposition with other foreign-relations histories.

This broad agenda, good as far as it goes, neglects a fundamental and necessarily unsettling interpretive collision about to play out within the CCP foreign-relations field. Its resolution bears directly on the kind of agenda the field will follow. As historians turn to CCP foreign relations, they will bring with them an anthropological concern with culture and a post-modern sensitivity to language, both currently strong preoccupations within their discipline. Those interpretive proclivities are distinctly at odds with at least three fundamental features of the established literature and discourse defined by political science. Finding ways to make fresh, thoughtful use of the new historical evidence is here as perhaps in general inextricably tied to a critical examination of older, well worn, and often narrow channels of interpretation.

One point of conflict arises from the long-established tendency to cast policy in terms of antinomies that in effect impose an interpretive strait-jacket. The literature is peppered with reference to policies that are supposed to fit in one of several either/or categories. Policies were either “idealist” or “realist.” They were either “ideologically driven” or responsive to “situational factors.” They were shaped either by the “international system” or by “domestic determinants.” These alternatives confront scholars with an interpretive dilemma that they often resolve by impaling themselves on one or the other of its horns.

Of all the dualisms, none is more pervasive and troubling than the idea of the “international system” and its conceptual twin, “domestic determinants.” A moment of critical reflection reminds us that the make-up of the international system is not self-evident, and those who champion its power to shape national policy differ widely on what the system is and how it works. Claims for the primacy of “domestic determinants” suffer from an equally serious problem: “domestic” is understood so narrowly and “determinants” is taken so literally that the phrase is almost drained of its significance.

The impulse to distinguish domestic and international influences may not be particularly useful in understanding the foreign policy of any country, and in the case of China draws a distinction that party leaders from Chen Duxiu to Deng Xiaoping would have found baffling, even wrong-headed. The growing availability of documentation makes it possible to argue what common sense already suggests—that discussions of Chinese policy need to transcend this and the other stark categories that narrow and impoverish our discourse.

Some scholars (including political scientists) have already begun to escape these stark alternatives. They have shown not just that Mao and his colleagues operated within an international arena of Cold War rivalry and in a China of revolutionary aspirations and conflict but also that those worlds overlapped and interacted. Conclusions drawn from the behavior of the American imperialists, upheavals observed in Eastern Europe, and Nikita Khrushchev’s theses on peaceful coexistence played off against internal discussions and debates about the best road for China’s socialist development, treatment of peasants and intellectuals, the nature of party leadership, and China’s appropriate place in a world revolutionary movement. Together the foreign and the domestic strands were interwoven into a single web, and neither strand can be removed without doing fundamental harm to our understanding of the whole.

A second point of likely conflict is an interpretive vocabulary whose unexamined assumptions exercise a quiet but nonetheless dangerous linguistic tyranny. Any reader of international relations would recognize the widely used lexicon, including prominently such terms as “national interest,” “strategic interests,” “geostrategic imperatives,” and “geopolitical realities.” Thus we get accounts that confidently proclaim China’s foreign relations is “propelled by national interests” (not its evil twin, “ideology”). Other accounts seek to differentiate “pragmatic” policies (usually linked with Zhou Enlai’s or Deng Xiaoping’s name) from “radical” or “provocative” policies (here Mao or the “Gang of Four” is likely to appear), and hold up as an ideal a “balance-of-power” approach that secures “strategic interests,” “national security,” and “foreign-policy interests” in a changing “international system.”

While this language most commonly appears in American writing on contemporary China, Chinese scholars writing about their country’s foreign policy have been showing signs of appropriating this vocabulary. Influenced by American international relations literature as well by their own search for a usable foreign-policy past, they have emphasized the neatly formulated and smoothly executed nature of Chinese policy and held up Zhou Enlai as a model of “realism” and “expertise,” while wrestling over whether to make Mao’s contributions to foreign-policy “realistic” or “ideological.”

Beyond this vocabulary lurks a strongly judgmental impulse antipathetic to less universal, more culture-specific insights. Understanding policy, whatever its complexities, takes a back seat to handing down a clear-cut verdict based on what a “rational” or “realistic” actor would have done in a particular set of circumstances.

The Korean War literature starkly illustrates this point about the powerful impulse to evaluate the rationality or realism of policy. Chinese scholars have joined Americans in reporting approvingly on Beijing’s reassuringly clear, unitary, and above all carefully calculated response to U.S. intervention on the peninsula. In the American literature on deterrence China’s handling of the Korean War has even been enshrined as a positive model in striking contrast to the bumbling of U.S. policymakers at the time. Subjected now to a closer look thanks to the new evidence, this positive characterization seems wide of the mark. Mao and his associates, it now turns out, were themselves engulfed in the kind of messy and confused decisionmaking that also afflicted American leaders. Viewed in this new light, Beijing’s reaction to the Korean crisis be-
comes interesting not so much for the evaluative question of who did the better job but rather for the interpretive question of how we understand the limits of cultural understanding and human control in a story strongly marked by chaos and contingency. These observations are not meant to deny rationality on the part of Chinese policymakers or for that matter on the part of Americans but to highlight the difficulty of evaluating policy rationality, especially with the help of simple, dichotomous notions of policy as either realistic or idealistic, driven by either careful calculations of national interest or by ungu- vernable ideological impulses.27

Though the critique of the rational actor model is widely made and apparently widely accepted,28 much of the CCP literature still seems unusually preoccupied with distinguishing sound from misguided policy. This siren call to make judgments about international behavior finds a response in all of us, but answering the call carries dangers. The most apparent is the tendency for simple judgments and a polemical style to appeal most strongly when limited evidence affords the weakest supporting grounds for them. For example, it was easy to offer up an idealized Mao when his own party decided what we should know, and it was natural to move toward a negative appraisal when new revelations thrust at us serious, previously unsuspected personal flaws. As the evidence becomes fuller and more reliable for Mao as for the CCP in general, older judgments must confront previously unimagined moral and political dimensions, and what previously seemed self-evident evaluations dissolve into complexity.

But beyond the simple problem of judgments handed down on scant or skewed evidence there is a broader and more complex problem. The claim to understand and judge “national interest,” “national security,” and so forth rests on a fundamentally metaphysical faith that value preferences serve to settle otherwise eminently debatable issues. That claim becomes often unthinkingly universalistic when scholars discover in countries and cultures other than their own roughly comparable notions of national interest and national security—at least among policymakers deemed sufficiently skilled in the realist calculus of power. The inadvertent results of this rational actor framework are judgments that are fundamentally culture-bound or at least that employ a definition of culture so narrow as to close off potentially interesting lines of investigation. Historians more interested in understanding the past than judging it will find limited appeal in hauling CCP leaders into court and formulating a verdict on the basis of their realism.

The third interpretive impulse likely to create conflict is a notion of ideology that is ahistorical and anemic. This unfortunate approach to the role of ideas in policymaking is in part a reflection of the rigid dualisms and fixation with rationality discussed above. It is also a reflection of a broader tendency during the Cold War to denigrate ideology as a peculiar deformation of the socialist bloc, a tendency that carried over into the China field as international relations specialists, schooled in comparative communi- nism, applied a Soviet model to Chinese politics. In their accounts a pervasive, power- ful Marxist-Leninist ideology came to offer an important key to understanding Chinese policy.

The resulting notions of CCP ideology are, it would now appear, ahistorical. The use of the Soviet Union as a starting point for understanding Chinese thinking may be unwise and is certainly premature because the Soviet model is itself drawn in narrow politi- cal terms and lacks firm historical ground- ing.29 Moreover, the Chinese party, which itself only recently began to come into sharper historical focus, is unlikely to offer an easy fit with any Soviet template.30 Indeed, we may look back on this Sino-Soviet ideological model and realize that the conclusions drawn from one set of highly circumstantial studies became the foundation for another set of equally circumstantial studies.

The prevalent thin, abstract conception of ideology should not divert our attention from more subtle and perhaps powerful in- formal ideologies that may be of consider- ably greater analytic value.31 Examining the intellectual predispositions and funda- mental assumptions that constitute informal ideology may render us more sensitive to the cultural and social influences over policy. Such an approach may thus help us better understand how calculations of “interest” are rooted in social structure and filtered through a screen of culturally conditioned assumptions and how individual responses to “objective” circumstances in the interna- tional environment are profoundly condi- tioned by personal background, beliefs, and surroundings.

Analysts using imposed, culture-bound categories find themselves in much the same impossible situation an outsider would face in trying to understand the Australian ab- originies who spoke Dyirbal. To ignore their language is to close the door to understanding their world with its unfamiliar classification: bayi (human males, animals); balan (human females, water, fire, fighting); balan (nonflesh food); and bala (a residual cat- egory).32 This breakdown may not make much sense to an outsider, but if getting into the head of the “other” is important, then uncovering the particular categories used to constitute their world is essential. By con- trast, the conceptual baggage the observer brings from home must be counted a serious impediment. Employing outside frames of reference may obscure more China-centered and China-sensitive perspectives and thereby divert us from our ultimate destination—the understanding of China’s beliefs and behavior in international affairs.33

One promising way to get beyond simple and mutually exclusive notions of CCP ide- ology—for example, either making it “Marx- ism-Leninism” or “nationalism”—is to think of it as a fabric that we can better understand by following the strand of keywords. A close look at those keywords and the relationship among them might prove helpful in defining policy discourse over time and un- locking contending visions of China’s place in the world.34

“Patriotism” (aiguo zhuyi) is one of those neglected keywords examined earlier in these pages. Another is “small and weak nationali- ties” (ruoxiao minzu). It too would repay close examination, revealing complexities not easily spotted in a straightforward reading of formal party statements. Like patriotism, this term had its roots in the late Qing, and persisted in CCP discourse from the party founding through the Maoist era and even beyond, injecting into it ten- sions as well as unintended ironies. China at times offered flamboyant rhetorical support for its revolutionary neighbors, but it has also collided with India and Vietnam, both important members of that community to which China claimed to belong. How has the concept of “small and weak nationali- ties” evolved, and what has China’s regional ambitions and limited resources done to reconstitute the meaning of that term?

This discussion of keywords suggests
that we need a more subtle and expansive notion of ideology—one that includes more than the formal ideology that the party utilized as an organizational glue and mobilization guide—if we are to move toward a richer understanding of CCP external relations. The network of ideas that make up an informal ideology is a complex, unstable amalgam drawn from a wide variety of sources and varying significantly from individual to individual. Some party leaders had experienced formative brushes with anarchism. Others had reacted strongly against disturbing urban conditions that made capitalism the main foe. Yet others constructed from their rural roots a populist outlook. Each borrowed from a rich, complex intellectual tradition, drew from distinct regional roots, and learned from diverse political experience as youths. A more penetrating grasp of Chinese policy depends ultimately on exploring the enormous diversity of thinking that shaped its course.

The negotiation of these and other points of difference between historians and political scientists will redefine the agenda for CCP foreign-policy studies and in the process help recast a field already in the midst of important change as a result of the revival of CCP studies in China. Historians taking a more prominent place in the field will be advancing a new constellation of questions and methods. The response by political scientists will doubtless vary with those of a descriptive bent finding it easy, while those devoted to theory may well find the transition awkward. How much this interaction across disciplinary lines will lead to a new mix of concerns and approaches and how much historians and political scientists will turn their back on each other, effectively creating a schism in the field, remains to be seen. Whatever the outcome outside of China, party historians within China are for their part likely to maintain a largely autonomous community interacting selectively with foreigner counterparts. Thus this trend toward a more historical picture of CCP external relations, at work in both the United States and China, is not likely to lead to a new monolithic field. And perhaps this outcome, marked by national and disciplinary diversity, is to be welcomed if it proves conducive to the wide-ranging inquiry and lively discussions associated with a field in renaissance.


2. Yao Xu, “KangMei yuanChao de yangming jude” [The brilliant decision to resist America and aid Korea], Dangshi yanjiu 5 (1980), 5-14. A new generation of scholarship heralded by Yao’s work did greatly improve on earlier thin and domestically oriented accounts such as Hu Zhongchi, KangMei yuanChao yundong yundong shihua [An historical insight of the resist-America aid-Korea campaign] (Beijing: Zhonghua qingnian, 1956), which had its own, even more pronounced patriotic premises. 3. The tendencies are evident in Ding Shouhe and Yin Shuyi, Cong wusi qingnian yundong dava makesi zhuyi de chuqu [From May Fourth enlightenment to the propa-gation of Marxism] (rev. ed.; Beijing: Sanlian, 1979), esp. 88-108; Lu Mingzhou, “Li Dazhao zai wusi yundong shi qi le di fandian sixiang” [Li Dazhao’s anti-imperialist thought during the period of the May Fourth move-ment], in Jinian wusi yundong liushi zhounian xuexu taolunhui lunwenxuan [A selection of articles from a scholarly conference in commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the May Fourth movement], ed. Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1980), 2: 151-63. It is also important to note that Lin Shunhua and He Rongdi, “Shilun Lin Dazhao de fandian shihua” [An exploration of Li Dazhao’s anti-imperial-ist thought], in Li Dazhao yanjiu lunwenjilu [A collection of research papers on Li Dazhao], ed. Han Yide and Wang Shudi (2 vols.: Shijiazhuan, Hebei renmin, 1984), 2: 515-29.


5. The earliest Chinese version appears to be Waiqiu jizhe xibei xinxiangji [A foreign reporter’s impressions of the northwest] (Shanghai: Dingchou bianyi she, 1937). A partial copy is in the Wang Fu Shih collection, University Archives, University of Missouri, Kansas City. Hu Yuzhi translated one of the early versions, perhaps this one. Snow’s account was also published under the title Xixing minji [Notes on a journey to the west] and Mao Zedong zhihuan [Mao Zedong’s autobiography]. For details on the production of the autobiography, see Zhonggong zhexue yu xinxiang ji [A collection of Mao Zedong works on journalism] (Beijing: Xinhua, 1983), 37-38; Wu Leping, comp., Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo xuanwu [A Selection of Mao Zedong works on journalism] (Beijing: Renmin, 1979), 1, 6-9; and Qiu Ke’an, Sinuo zai Zhongguo [Snow in China] (Beijing: Sanlian, 1982).

6. This and the paragraph that follows draw on Xu Quanxing and Wei Shifeng, chief authors, Yenan shiqu de Mao Zedong [The home province of Mao Zedong] (originally published 1948; rev. and exp. ed., Guangzhou: Xinhua, 1950).


9. Mao Zedong xuanji [Selected works of Mao Zedong], vol. 5 (Beijing: Renmin, 1977); Mao Zedong xuanji [Selected works of Mao Zedong], vol. 2 (Beijing: Renmin, 1986). More revealing than the public “resolution on certain historical issues concern- ing the party since the founding of the PRC” (“Guanyu jianguo yilai dandan de rangong lishi de jueyi”), which the limited circulation treatment of sensitive issues raised by this reappraisal, in Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiu [The “Genius” of Chinese policy] (originally published 1948; rev. and exp. ed., Guangzhou: Xinhua, 1950).


12. The negotiation of these and other points of difference between historians and political scientists will redefine the agenda for CCP foreign-policy studies and in the process help recast a field already in the midst of important change as a result of the revival of CCP studies in China. Historians taking a more prominent place in the field will be advancing a new constellation of questions and methods. The response by political scientists will doubtless vary with those of a descriptive bent finding it easy, while those devoted to theory may well find the transition awkward. How much this interaction across disciplinary lines will lead to a new mix of concerns and approaches and how much historians and political scientists will turn their back on each other, effectively creating a schism in the field, remains to be seen. Whatever the outcome outside of China, party historians within China are for their part likely to maintain a largely autonomous community interacting selectively with foreigner counterparts. Thus this trend toward a more historical picture of CCP external relations, at work in both the United States and China, is not likely to lead to a new monolithic field. And perhaps this outcome, marked by national and disciplinary diversity, is to be welcomed if it proves conducive to the wide-ranging inquiry and lively discussions associated with a field in renaissance.

12. See e.g., Susan Naquin and Evelyn S. Rawski, *Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), which begins by stressing the importance of relating the actions of the state to “the lives of even ordinary citizens” (xi).


16. One distinguished China-watcher has proposed careful examination of past forecasting as a way of highlighting possible future interpretive problems as well as identifying past successes. Allen S. Whiting, “Forecasting Chinese Foreign Policy: IR Theory vs. the Fortune Cookie,” in *Chinese Foreign Policy*, eds. Robinson and Shambaugh, 506-23. This proposal tellingly omits historical reconstruction of the very events analysts were trying to read. Without a fresh, well-documented picture of those events it is hard to imagine measuring with any confidence the accuracy of contemporary readings.


have had their major writings published. The Mao collection (discussed below) is the best known, but the list extends to those who played a prominent role briefly in the mid- and late 1920s (such as Qu Qiubai and Peng Shuzhi), the group that accompanied Mao to the top (such as Liu Shaoqi, Wang Jiaxiang, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Dehuai, and Chen Yun), party intellectuals (such as Chen Hansheng and Ai Siqi), notable public supporters (such as Song Qingling), and even that party black sheep, Wang Ming. These volumes appear variously as wenji (collected works), wenxuan (selected works), xuanji (selections), and in several cases junshi wenxuan (selected works on military affairs). Generally these collections, especially the ones published in the early decades of the PRC, are less revealing on foreign affairs than the more recent materials. The collected works for a few of the best known party figures can be found in translation.


Party history journals are a treasure trove, offering fresh documentation, revealing articles, and news of conferences and pending publications. A number of the chief journals underwent a confusing set of title changes in the late 1980s, and most are restricted in their circulation. They are as a result difficult for researchers outside of China to keep straight and use systematically. Of these journals Dangde wenxian [Literature on the party] (published by Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi and Zhongyang dang’anguan, 1988-; “internal circulation”) and its earlier incarnation, Wenxian he yanjiu [Documents and research] (published by Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, 1982-87; “internal circulation”), deserve singling out for their fresh documentation as well as helpful articles.

Rise of an International Affairs Orthodoxy (1921-1934)


Writings from the People’s Republic of China offer such a constricted treatment of the CCP’s May Fourth background that they are of only limited use. Broader perspectives are available in documentary collections such as Wusi aiguo yundong [The May Fourth patriotic movement], comp. Zhongguo shehui kexue jia jingji yu jingji ziliao bianjizu (2 vols.; Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1979); and Shehui ziliao bianjizu (2 vols.; Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang), comp. Yuan Qian et al. (1922-27) and the collections of Central Committee documents (noted above). Evidence on the general attractiveness of anti-imperialism as a tool of political mobilization can be found in Wusa yundong shiliao [Historical materials on the May 30 (1925) movement], comp. Shanghai shehui kexueyuan lishi yanjiusuo, vol. 1 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin, 1981); Sanyibao yundong ziliao [Materials on the March 18 (1926) movement], comp. Sun Duheng and Wen Hai (Beijing: Renmin, 1984); and Sanyibao can’an ziliao [Materials on the March 18 (1926) massacre], comp. Jiang Changren (Beijing: Beijing, 1985).


To form a more precise impression of CCP views on imperialism, turn to contemporaneous materials, notably prominent party journals such as Xiangdao zhoubao [The guide weekly] (1922-27) and the collections of Central Committee documents (noted above). Evidence on the general attractiveness of anti-imperialism as a tool of political mobilization can be found in Wusa yundong shiliao [Historical materials on the May 30 (1925) movement], comp. Shanghai shehui kexueyuan lishi yanjiusuo, vol. 1 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin, 1981); Sanyibao yundong ziliao [Materials on the March 18 (1926) movement], comp. Sun Duheng and Wen Hai (Beijing: Renmin, 1984); and Sanyibao can’an ziliao [Materials on the March 18 (1926) massacre], comp. Jiang Changren (Beijing: Beijing, 1985).


Among a substantial collection of general surveys in Chinese on the CCP and the Comintern, the standouts are Xiang Qing, Gongchuan guoji he Zhongguo geming guanxi shigao [Draft history of the relations between the Comintern and the Chinese revolution] (Beijing: Beijing daxue, 1988); Yang Yunruo and Yang Kuisong, Gongchuan guoji he Zhongguo geming [The Comintern and the Chinese revolution] (Shanghai: Shangh hai renmin, 1988); and Yang Kuisong, Zhongjian didai de geming: Zhongguo geming de cellei zai guoji beijing xia de yanbian [Revolution in the intermediate zone: The development of China’s revolutionary strategy against an international background] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxia, 1992), the freshest and most detailed treatment. All three accounts carry the story into the 1940s—down to the dissolution of the Comintern and beyond.


The Emergence of a Foreign Policy (1935-1949)

The CCP’s handling of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Pacific War and into the early Cold War period has been the subject of roughly three decades of serious scholarship. The appearance of new documentation has rendered much of that literature obsolete and compromised interpretations advanced as recently as the late 1980s. Several major works drawing on the fresh source materials have already appeared. John W. Garver’s Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) stresses the CCP’s policy of maneuver and places Mao alongside Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] as a nationalist whose outlook drove him into “rebellion” (274) against Moscow. Odd Arne Westad’s Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), sets Mao’s policy in an impressively international context and pictures as largely abortive his efforts to make the great powers serve his party’s cause in the immediate aftermath of World War II.


A number of studies prepared without benefit of the recently released documentation are still worth attention. James Reardon-Anderson, Yenan and the Great Powers: The Origins of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 1944-1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), stirred up debate by minimizing ideological constraints on CCP policy and by arguing for a “lost chance” at the end of the Pacific War when the CCP was frustrated in its attempt to avert Sino-American hostility and to minimize dependence on the Soviet Union.


Levine’s own major statement, Anvil of


Some of the issues raised by this literature are discussed in Kathleen J. Hartford and Steven M. Goldstein, “Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution,” in Single Spaks: China’s Rural Revolutions, ed. Goldstein and Hartford (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1989), 3-33.

PRC historians have led the way in filling out the picture of CCP policy from the late 1930s down to 1949. The most ambitious account to date is Niu Jun’s Cong Yanan zouxiang shijie: Zhongguo gongchandang daiwai guanxi de qi yuan [Moving from Yanan toward the world: the origins of Chinese Communist foreign relations] (Fuzhou: Fujian remnin, 1992). Niu locates the origins of the CCP’s independent foreign policy in the Yanan years, and perhaps better than any other account—in English or Chinese—provides the supporting evidence. He builds here on his earlier work on the CCP’s handling of the Hurley and Marshall missions, Cong He’erli dao Maxie’er: Meiguotiaochu guogong maodan shimo [From Hurley to Marshall: a full account of the U.S. mediation of the contradictions between the Nationalists and the Communists] (Fuzhou: Fujian remnin, 1988).


Key sources for this period, aside from the central party documents mentioned above, are Zhongwang tongzhuanbu and Zhongyang dang’anguan, comps., Zhongyanggongzongangbang Renminzhongtongyi zhixian wenxian juanbian [A selection of documents on the CCP Central Committee’s national anti-Japanese united front] (3 vols.; Beijing: Dang’an, 1984-86); and Zhongyanggongdongban and Zhongyang dang’anguan, comps., Zhongyanggong jiefangjun shiqu tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian [A selection of documents on the CCP Central Committee’s united front during the period of liberation struggle] (Beijing: Dang’an, 1988; “internal circulation”).

Personal accounts are useful in supplementing the primary collections. See Shi Zhe with Li Haiwen, Zhai listi juran shenbian: Shi Zhe huiyilu [Alongside the giants of history: Shi Zhe’s memoir] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1991); Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu [The memoirs of Nie Rongzhen] (3 vols.; Beijing: Janshi, 1983; and Jiefangjun, 1984); Wu Xiuquan, Wode licheng [My course] (Beijing: Jiefangjun, 1984); Peter Vladimirov, The Vladimirov Diary, Yenan, China: 1942-1945 (Garden City, N.Y., 1975), a translation that is not as complete as the Russian original, and in any case betrays a tendentious quality that invites some suspicion; and Ivan V. Kovalev and Sergei N. Goncharov, “Stalin’s Dialogue with Mao Zedong,” trans. Craig Seibert, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 10 (Winter 1991-92), 45-76. Chen Jian has translated the portions of the Shi Zhe memoir dealing with the 1949 missions by Mikoyan and Liu Shaoqi in Chinese Historians 5 (Spring 1992), 35-46; and 6 (Spring 1993), 67-90.

Mao Zedong

Anyone interested in tracing Mao’s evolving outlook on international affairs and his central policy role from the mid-1930s has an embarrassment of documentary riches to contend with. Indeed, a wide variety of materials have accumulated upon layer so that systematic research requires considerable patience. Those who press on will find as their reward Mao emerging from these materials a more complex and more interesting figure than previously guessed.


There is a good body of writings on Mao’s early years. The starting point has long been Mao’s own recital in Edgar Snow’s *Red Star Over China* (originally published 1938; New York: Grove Press, 1961). The first to add to the picture was Xiao San (Emi Hsiao), *Mao Zedong tongzhi de zaoqi geming huodong* [Comrade Mao Zedong’s boyhood and youth] (originally published 1948; rev. and exp. ed., Guangzhou: Xinhua, 1950). A translation is available as *Mao Tse-tung: His Childhood and Youth* (Bombay: People’s Publishing House, 1953).


Collections compiled by the party history establishment in China over the last decade have added significant, fresh light on Mao’s general outlook and his emergence as a maker of foreign policy. These collections include Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjushi, comps., *Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji* [A selection of Mao Zedong correspondence] (Beijing: Renmin, 1983); Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjushi, comps., *Mao Zedong xinwen gongzuo wenxuan* [A selection of Mao Zedong works on journalism] (Beijing: Xinhua, 1983); and Zhonggong zhongyang tongyi zhanxian gongzuo yanjushi et al., comps., *Mao Zedong lun tongyi zhanxian* [Mao Zedong on the united front] (Beijing: Zhongguo wenxian, 1988).


A second is the detailed and authoritative account of Mao’s emergence and triumph as a revolutionary leader in Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjushi (under the direction of Pang Xianzhi), *Mao Zedong niangu, 1893-1949* [A chronological biography of Mao Zedong, 1893-1949] (3 vols.; Beijing: Renmin and Zhongying wenxian, 1993). A third is Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjushi, comps., *Mao Zedong wenji* [Collected works of Mao Zedong] (2 vols. to date; Beijing: Renmin, 1983- ); which stands as a supplement to the well known *xuanji* (selected works) but which is largely silent on international issues. A fourth anniversary collection on Mao’s diplomacy has also appeared: *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan* [Selected Diplomatic Papers of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1994). Helpful in putting Mao’s role in the revolution in context are collections of central party documents and the documents on overall united front policy from 1935-1948 (both cited above).

For the post-1949 Mao turn to the classified series compiled by Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjushi, Jiangyu yilai *Mao Zedong wencao* [Mao Zedong manuscripts for the period following the establishment of the country] (8 vols. to date; Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1987-; “internal circulation”). This series sheds new light on Mao and world affairs down to the late 1950s, and taken together with the outpouring of Mao material during the Cultural Revolution, gives us the basis for beginning to understand Mao’s PRC years. The formidable task of collecting, collating, and verifying these materials has only begun. For a good recent guide, see Timothy Cheek, “Textually Speaking: An Assessment of Newly Available Mao Texts,” in *The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao: From the Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap Forward*, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar et al. (Cambridge:

To make the post-1949 Mao materials available in English, Michael Y. M. Kau and John K. Leung launched a translation series in 1986. Two volumes of their The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976 (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1986-) have appeared to date covering the period down to December 1957. Their formidable task has been complicated by the continuing flow of new materials out of China. Translated fragments are available elsewhere—in a variety of publications by U.S. Joint Publications Research Service (better known as JPRS); in Stuart Schram, Chairman Mao Talks to the People: Talks and Letters, 1956-1971 (New York: Pantheon, 1975); and in MacFarquhar et al., The Secret Speeches (cited above).

**Zhou Enlai**


**The Foreign Policy of the PRC**

The new sources and studies that have refashioned our understanding of early CCP attitudes and policies are just beginning to have an impact on the post-1949 period. Until more documentary publications appear and are digested, it is likely that our understanding of PRC foreign policy will remain thin and fragmentary, and the writings in English on the topic will for the most part hold to the well-established political science approaches.


The PRC’s exercise of control over border regions is still only poorly understood. For the moment the best places to start are Dreyer, China’s Forty Millions (cited above); A. Tom Grunfeld, The Making of Modern Tibet (London: Zed, and Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1987), chaps. 5-11; and Donald H. McMillen, Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949-1977 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1979).

The general secondary accounts in Chinese on post-1949 policy increasingly reflect the new openness in the PRC but still stick close to the official line. Han Nianlong, chief comp., Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao [Chinese foreign affairs in recent times] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan, 1987) is the best known of these. That volume has been translated as Diplomacy of Contemporary China (Hong Kong: New Horizon, 1990) by Qiu Ke’an. It appears as a part of the series “Dangdai Zhongguo” (Contemporary China), which includes studies on the armed forces also germane to foreign policy. Zhongguo waijiaoshi: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo qishi [A diplomatic history of China: The PRC period, 1949-1979] (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin, 1988) is a major survey produced by Xie Yixian, who served in the foreign service before taking up teaching duties in the Foreign Ministry’s Foreign Affairs College.

These accounts should be supplemented by such memoirs as Bo Yibo, Ruogan...

For the Korean War, Allen S. Whiting’s *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (originally published 1960; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968) was a path-breaking work that long stood as the single, indispensable work. His account of Chinese signalling from June to November 1950 depicted Beijing as neither Moscow-dominated nor irrational but acting essentially out of fear of “a determined, powerful enemy on China’s doorstep” (159). A decade later Edward Friedman, “Problems in Dealing with anIRRATIONAL Power,” in *America’s Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations*, ed. Friedman and Mark Selden (New York: Pantheon, 1971), followed Whiting in stressing the defensive, calculated, and rational nature of Chinese policy and Beijing’s “complex and differentiated view of American foreign policy” (212). The theme that China was essentially responding in Korea to a danger to its security again enjoyed prominence in Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, *China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1980), chap. 2., although by this point other competing concerns—domestic issues, divisions within the leadership, and strong internationalist elements in Beijing’s justification for intervention—were beginning to creep into the picture and blur the interpretation.


The most detailed and up-to-date accounts of the war’s origins are to be found in Chen Jian, *China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), notable for its stress on the strong revolutionary streak in Mao’s foreign
The subsequent Sino-American crisis over the Taiwan Strait and Vietnam is getting increasing scrutiny by scholars exploiting fragmentary PRC revelations and documentation. Zhang Shu Guan, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: China-American Confrontations, 1949-1958 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), relates new information from Chinese sources to theoretical concerns with deterrence, calculated decision-making, and “learning” by policymakers. John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), reveals how Mao’s public dismissal of the American nuclear threat was belied by a high-priority program to create a Chinese bomb.


how the situation has changed in the age of “reform and opening to the outside world.” Insofar as the original works of CCP leaders are concerned, the archives storing them, especially Beijing’s Central Archives, remain inaccessible to most scholars (both Chinese and Western). If one carefully examines the contents of the selected works of CCP leaders that have been compiled and published since the early 1980s (especially the editions “for internal circulation only”), however, it is easy to find that the policy of “reform and opening to the outside world” has made its stamp on them. Put simply, the “selected works” compiled and published in the 1980s and 1990s are more substantial, and, so far as their texts are concerned, more reliable than previous collections. To make this point clear, I will introduce and examine several major “selected works” compiled and published during this period.

1. *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji* (Selected Documents of the CCP Central Committee). This documentary collection covers the period from 1921 to 1949 in two different editions: A fourteen volume internal edition published in the mid-1980s, and an eighteen volume open edition published in the early 1990s.2 Both editions contain many previously unpublished materials. The open edition contains almost fifteen percent more documents than the earlier internal one (however, a few “sensitive documents” that were included in the internal edition disappeared from the open edition). The “quality” of some of the documents is impressive. For example, the Central Committee’s “Instructions on Diplomatic Affairs,” dated 18 August 1944, clearly reveals the CCP leadership’s perception of international affairs as well as its calculation on how the Party should best deal with the perceived situation. These documents provide scholars with valuable information for understanding important decisions by the CCP leadership.

2. *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao* (Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China).3 The publication of this series began in late 1987, with eight volumes published by 1995, covering the period from October 1949 to December 1959. Although these volumes are marked “for internal circulation only,” it is not difficult for scholars outside of China to gain access to them. For example, the Yenching Library and the library of John K. Fairbank Center at Harvard University, the East Asian Library at Columbia University, the East Asian Library at Stanford University, the East Asian Library at Toronto University, the Asian Section of Library of Congress, and many other East Asian libraries in North America have collected various volumes of this set.

The documents published in this collection are of high historical value. They cover, among other things, such important events as Mao Zedong’s visit to the Soviet Union in 1949-1950; China’s participation in the Korean War in 1950-1953; Mao Zedong’s direction of the “Three-Antis” and “Five-Antis” Movements in 1951-1952; Mao’s and the CCP leadership’s management of relations with the Soviet Union in the mid- and late 1950s; Mao’s management of the Taiwan Crisis and the potential confrontation with the United States in 1958; Mao’s handling of the “Anti-Rightist Movement” and the “Great Leap Forward” in 1957-1958; and Mao’s presentations at the Lushan Conference in 1959. In many places, the documents published in this collection confirm the inner-Party statements and instructions by Mao divulged during the “Cultural Revolution” years.4 But the majority of the documents contained in this collection have never been released in the past. Most of the documents are published in their entirety; some, however, are published only in part. The quality of the eight published volumes is uneven. The first volume, which covers the period from October 1949 to December 1950, is one of the best. It offers, among other things, a quite detailed coverage of Mao’s visit to the Soviet Union, as well as how the CCP leadership made the decision to enter the Korean War.5 Volume Four, covering the 1953-1954 period, is, compared with other volumes, extremely thin. As a whole, this collection provides scholars with much fresh information (compared with what we knew in the past) and, therefore, must be regarded as a basic reference for the study of Mao Zedong, the Chinese revolution, and the history of the People’s Republic of China.

3. *Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan* (Selected Military Papers of Mao Zedong)6 and *Mao Zedong junshi wenji* (A Collection of Mao Zedong’s Military Papers, 6 volumes).7 Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan, published in the early 1980s, contains many previously unknown inner-Party instructions and telegrams by Mao, especially the telegraphic communications between Mao and Chinese field commanders during the early stage of China’s military intervention in Korea (October-December 1950). Its circulation was highly restricted at first; after the mid-1980s, however, it became available to scholars outside of China through several channels, especially after it had been reprinted by a publisher in Hong Kong. The six-volume *Mao Zedong junshi wenji* was published in December 1993, on the 100th anniversary of Mao’s birthday. Its coverage is extraordinarily uneven. The first five volumes, which cover the period from the late 1920s to 1949, include many documents released only for the first time. The sixth volume, which covers the period from 1949 to 1976, contains almost nothing new compared with the previously published *Mao Zedong junshi wenji* and *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*. In actuality, many documents concerning Mao’s military activities during this post-revolution period published in the other two collections are deleted from this volume. This is a great disappointment for scholars who are interested in Mao’s activities during the PRC period.

4. *Mao Zedong waixiao wenxuan* (Selected Diplomatic Papers of Mao Zedong).8 This collection focuses on Mao’s diplomatic and strategic activities, emphasizing the post-1949 period. Some of the documents published in this volume are of high historical value. For example, it has long been known to scholars that in the summer of 1958, a major dispute emerged between Beijing and Moscow in the wake of Moscow’s proposal to establish a joint Chinese-Soviet submarine flotilla. However, it has been unclear to scholars how this dispute developed. The minutes of a talk between Mao Zedong and P. F. Yudin, the Soviet ambassador to China, on July 22, 1958, published in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin, reveal the Chinese attitude, including Mao’s reasoning underlying it, toward this question.9

5. *Mao Zedong wenji* (A Collection of Mao Zedong’s Papers).10 This collection publishes Mao’s speeches, instructions, and telegrams not included in *Mao Zedong xuanji*. Among the quite impressive documents released are those about the CCP leadership’s handling of the Xian Incident of 1936.

6. *Mao Zedong nianpu* (A Chronicle of
Mao Zedong, 3 volumes). Published in December 1993, the 100th anniversary of Mao’s birth, it offers a quite detailed day-to-day account of Mao’s activities up to 1949. It releases many previously unknown important documents, going beyond the coverage of other Mao collections. For example, it publishes for the first time Mao Zedong’s telegram to the CCP’s Nanjing Municipal Committee dated 10 May 1949, in which Mao established the principles for Huang Hua to meet with John Leighton Stuart, the American ambassador to China who remained after the Communist takeover of Nanjing.

7. Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan (Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai). This is a collection of minutes of internal talks, instructions, statements, and speeches related to Zhou Enlai’s diplomatic activities. This collection includes some interesting documents, such as the Chinese minutes of Zhou Enlai’s talk with K.M. Pannikar, Indian Ambassador to China, early in the morning of 3 October 1950. During this meeting Zhou Enlai issued the warning that if the American forces crossed the 38th parallel in Korea, China would “intervene” in the conflict.

8. Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1898-1949 (A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai). This chronicle, like Mao Zedong nianpu, covers the period up to 1949. It offers a day-to-day account of Zhou Enlai’s activities, from his early years to the time of the nationwide victory of the Chinese revolution. The Collection includes complete texts of several important documents relating to Zhou Enlai.

9. Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 3 volumes). As China’s most important leader after Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping played a central role in China’s “reform and opening to the outside world” period. This collection offers researchers, as well as the general public, a window through which to study Deng Xiaoping’s thoughts. The most important volume of this collection is the third volume, which covers the period from 1982 to 1992, when Deng was indisputably China’s paramount leader (although he never assumed that title). Among the documents published in the volume is the talk Deng gave after the 1989 Tiananmen Square tragedy, in which Deng explained his reasoning for opening fire on the demonstrators on Beijing’s streets.

10. Peng Dehuai junshi wenxuan (Selected Military Papers of Peng Dehuai). As the PRC’s defense minister in the 1950s and the commander of the Chinese Volunteers in Korea, Peng Dehuai played an important role in developing China’s military and security strategies. This volume publishes some of Peng’s most important military papers, including his correspondences with Mao during the early stages of the Korean War.

In addition to the above-listed collections, other “selected works” that have been published since the 1980s include ones by Chen Yun, Hu Qiaomu, Liu Shaoqi, Nie Rongzhen, Wang Jiaxiang, Zhang Wentian, and Zhu De.

III

Compared with the “selected works” published earlier, the above list of “selected works” published in the 1980s and 1990s have several distinctive features. First, contrary to the earlier practice of making extensive excisions from, or even revisions in, the original documents for the sake of publication, the compilation and editing of most of the volumes published in the past decade are more faithful to the original text of the documents. For example, Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji, Mao Zedong nianpu, and Mao Zedong wenji differ from the Party’s propaganda in the past, indicating that the CCP’s management of the Xian Incident will find that the information offered by the documents in Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji, Mao Zedong nianpu, and Mao Zedong wenji differ from the CCP’s propaganda in the past, indicating that the CCP’s leadership’s attitude toward Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-Shek) had been strongly influenced, or even defined, by the Comintern.

However, one should not exaggerate the utility and significance of the historical documents released in “selected works.” The documents that have been included in the “selected works” of the 1980s and 1990s are only a small portion of the entire body of original documents, and the criteria used in their selection remain highly dubious. In reality, through other sources, we know for certain that many documents, which in the eyes of the editors have the potential of harming the image of the CCP and its leaders being “generally correct,” have been intentionally excluded from the selections.

An example of this practice is a telegram Mao Zedong sent to Peng Dehuai on 28 January 1951. Let me first give some background introduction. After Chinese troops entered the Korean War in October 1950, they waged three offensive campaigns from late October 1950 to early January 1951, driving the American/UN troops from areas close to the Chinese-Korean border to areas south of the 38th parallel. However, the Chinese forces exhausted their offensive potential because of heavy casualties, lack of air support, and the overextension of
supply lines. Therefore, when the American troops started a counteroffensive on 25 January 1951, Peng Dehuai, the Chinese commander, proposed a temporary retreat in a telegram to Mao on January 27. Mao, however, overestimated China’s strength. In a telegram to Peng the next day, he ordered Peng to use a Chinese/North Korean offensive to counter the American offensive. He even argued that the Chinese troops possessed the capacity to advance to the 36th parallel. 20 Mao’s instructions contributed to the military defeat of the Chinese troops on the Korean battlefield in spring 1951. This telegram is certainly important because it revealed Mao’s strategic thinking at a crucial point of the Korean War, and reflected the goals he hoped to achieve in Korea—driving the Americans out of the Korean peninsula, thus promoting China’s reputation and influence in East Asia while at the same time enhancing the Chinese revolution at home. However, this telegram also makes it clear that sometimes Mao’s judgment of the situation could be very poor. Although a few Chinese authors with access to classified documents have cited the telegram in its entirety, this important telegram is excluded from Jianguo yilai MaoZedong wenxuan and MaoZedong junshi wenji. 21 This, of course, is only one of many, many such cases.

The end of the Cold War makes it possible for scholars to gain access to documents from the former Soviet Union. Many of the Russian documents that have recently become available display discrepancies compared to what has been revealed by Chinese documents. In some cases these discrepancies expose the limit to which truth is revealed in the documents published in “selected works” in China. Here is another example. All the Chinese documents about the Korean War published in the first volume of Jianguo yilai MaoZedong wenxuan indicate that the Beijing leadership made the decision to enter Korean War in early October 1950. In a telegram dated October 2, Mao formally informed Stalin that the CCP leadership had made the decision to send troops to Korea. 22 However, Russian documents on the Korean War (which Russian President Yeltsin gave to South Korean President Kim Young-sam in June 1994) tell a different story. According to these documents, Mao Zedong informed Stalin on 3 October 1950 that China would not send troops to Korea, and it would take great efforts from Stalin to persuade the Chinese that it was in China’s basic interest to prevent the war from reaching China’s northeast border. (See the article by Alexandre Mansourov in this issue of the Bulletin.) Why does this discrepancy exist? What really happened between Beijing and Moscow in October 1950?

To answer these questions (and many other similar questions) scholars need full access to Beijing’s archives. “Selected works” are useful, but only in a highly limited sense. This is particularly true because even in the age of “reform and opening to the outside world,” the writing of Party history in China remains a business primarily designed to enhance the legitimacy of the Party’s reign in China. This means that materials released through “selected works” are often driven by intentions other than having the truth known, and, as a result, can be misleading.

Therefore, while it is wrong for China scholars to refuse to recognize the historical value of materials contained in “selected works,” it is dangerous and unwise for them to rely completely or uncritically on “selected work” sources. While using them, scholars must double check “selected works” materials against other sources, including information obtained from interviews. In the long run, scholars must be given full and equal access to Chinese archives to tell the story of the Chinese Communist revolution and China’s relationship with the outside world.

1. An earlier draft of this article was presented to an international symposium on “Local Chinese Archives and the Historiography of Modern China” at the University of Maryland, College Park, 5-7 October 1995.
5. For English translations of these documents, see Zhang Shuang and Chen Jian, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: Documentary Evidence, 1944-1950 (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1995), Part II.
9. Ibid., 322-333.
21. My interviews with researchers at Beijing’s Academy of Military Science, who were responsible for editing Mao Zedong junshi wenji, in summer 1991 confirmed that this telegram would not be included because of its “improper” content.

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CORRECTION

The Bulletin regrets that, due to production errors, a number of errors were introduced into the footnoting of Mark Kramer’s article in the Spring 1995 issue on “The ‘Lessons’ of the Cuban Missile Crisis for Warsaw Pact Nuclear Operations.” A corrected version will appear in the next issue.
THE SECOND HISTORICAL ARCHIVES OF CHINA: A Treasure House for Republican China Research

by Gao Hua
translated by Scott Kennedy

After arriving at Nanjing’s 309 Zhongshan East Road, passing the police stationed at their post and going through a routine check-in, researchers face a classical Chinese edifice—the famous Second Historical Archives of China (SHAC).¹

Established in February 1951, SHAC has one of the largest historical collections in China. The former tenant at the archive’s address was the “Committee for Compiling GMT [Guomindang] Party Historical Records.” After the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took over management of the Committee as well as the archives from the original “National History House.” Soon after, large quantities of documents concerning the GMT regime housed in Guangzhou (Canton), Chongqing (Chungking), Chengdu, Kunming, Shanghai and Beijing, as well as the archival records stored in Beijing on the Northern Warlords Government, were all moved to Nanjing, and together make up the foundation of SHAC’s collection.

At the heart of SHAC’s collection are the original records of the central organs of the various regimes in existence during the Republican era (1912-1949), namely: 1) the Nanjing Provisional Government (January-April 1912); 2) the Northern Warlords Government (April 1912 - June 1928); 3) the various GMT regimes, first centered in Guangzhou and Wuhan, and then as a national government in Nanjing (1927-1949); and 4) the various puppet regimes of the Japanese (e.g., Wang Jingwei’s Nanjing regime). The archives provide a detailed account of policy and actual conditions—at the central and local levels—on foreign policy, military matters, commerce and finance, culture and education, and even social customs. However, the materials of greatest number and value collected at SHAC are those archives concerning the GMT rule in Nanjing from 1927-1949.

From 1951 to 1979, SHAC’s doors remained closed to the public. During those years, the only significant work done was the compiling of a collection of archival documents, Zhongguo xiandai zhengzhishi ziliao huibian [A Compilation of Materials on Chinese Modern Political History]. The project, launched in 1956 with a directive from the CCP Central Committee Political Research Office, consumed SHAC’s entire energies for three years. Only 100 sets of the 244 volume, 21 million character collection were printed. They were then distributed to central party and political organs as well as some universities to be used as a research reference. At present, this important collection is the largest and richest set of materials concerning China’s domestic situation during the Republican era.

Since 1979, SHAC has made public a large number of documents one after another and published three major archival document sets: Zhonghua minguoshi dang’an ziliao huibian [A Compilation of Republican China History Archival Records], Zhonghua minguoshi dang’an ziliao conkan [A Series of Republican China History Archives], and Zhonghuaminguoshi dang’an ziliao congshu [A Collection of Republican China History Archives]. Finally, in 1985, SHAC launched the quarterly, Minguo dang’an [Republican Archives].

SHAC has been a resource on issues where historical questions influence current policy questions. Since 1986, Minguo dang’an has published a large number of documents concerning relations between Tibet and central government authorities. SHAC has also cooperated with Beijing’s “China Tibetan Studies Research Center” to publish three volumes of historical materials on Tibet. The journal has also published materials concerning China’s claim to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. SHAC provided the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with materials concerning China’s Republican-era relationship with Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. They recently allowed Taiwanese scholars to view documents concerning the 2-28 Incident (a massacre of Taiwanese by the GMT on 28 February 1947). Finally, geologists and policymakers involved in the planning of the controversial proposed Three Gorges dam have relied on SHAC for materials on relevant Republican-era research.

SHAC has formally been open to scholars for the past 14 years. Apart from the dossiers of various individuals, some judicial archives, and those which “involve national interest,” scholars are free to utilize all of SHAC’s files. Procedures for foreign scholars have also been dramatically simplified. However, due to the effects of economic reform, SHAC has also increased its fees for those scholars who have yet to use its services. SHAC is also planning to install an air-conditioned reading room as another service to foreigners, but, of course, you’ll have to pay.


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¹ Zhongguo dier lishi dang’anguan.
The Party’s highest ideal and ultimate goal is the realization of communism. The Communist Party of China uses Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Theory of Three Represents, the Scientific Outlook on Development, and Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era as its guides to action. Marxism-Leninism reveals the laws governing the development of the history of human society. Its basic tenets are correct and have tremendous vitality. The highest ideal of communism pursued by Chinese Communists can be realized only when socialist society is fully developed and highly advanced. For the foreign relations of the Republic of China, see Foreign relations of Taiwan. Diplomatic relations between world states and China. Unlike most other nations, much of Chinese foreign policy is formulated in think tanks sponsored and supervised by, but formally outside of the government. One distinctive aspect of Sino-American relations is that much of the foreign policy discussion takes place between interlocutors who form the think tanks. Because these discussions are unofficial, they are generally more free and less restricted than discussions between government officials. The result was that both Moscow and Beijing sponsored rival Communist parties around the world, which expended much of their energy fighting each other.