Stealing Fire from the Sky:  
Transvaluating Religion  
in the Service of Abortion

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ABSTRACT: In the 1980s, the advocates of abortion pleaded for “nuance” from leaders of traditional religions, but nowadays they assert without any nuance at all that abortion is a “traditional” and “sacred right” in all the world’s major religions. They argue that it therefore amounts to persecution, a violation of religious liberty, to restrict women’s access to abortion. This new attempt to seize the high moral and religious ground from the defenders of unborn life is bold in the extreme, but ultimately incoherent and unpersuasive. For the claim that abortion is “sacred” in the world’s religions is just not supported by the facts that are brought forward. Indeed, the advocates of abortion are themselves obliged to admit that Jewish, Christian, Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist traditions will all have to be changed and adapted to contemporary mores in order to serve the cause of untrammeled abortion.

UNTIL A DECADE AGO, the defenders of abortion insisted that there was “moral ambiguity” and “complexity” in the decision to abort, so a woman had to be left alone to make her “choice.” In those days they complained of the moral “absolutism” of pro-life advocates and urged them to be more “nuanced” in their view of abortion. By such rebukes they wanted to deflect or attenuate religious and moral condemnation. Until recently they were willing to concede that the world’s major religions had traditionally regarded abortions as wrong, even while most permitted them in limited cases.

But in the last decade there has been a sea-change in strategy. Those in the vanguard of the pro-abortion camp now say that having an abortion amounts to practicing one’s religion: “We must not seek legislation that would limit the freedom of members of these faith
groups to practice their religion.” 2 They declare that if access to abortion is restricted, it amounts to “religious persecution.” 3 Gone is their plea for “nuance.” Now they claim that abortion is clearly and certainly “grounded” in all the world’s major religious traditions. 4 The Ford Foundation and the David and Lucile Packard Foundation are giving financial support to this new project, which has resulted in a recent book called Sacred Rights: The Case for Contraception and Abortion in World Religions, edited by Daniel Maguire. 5 In this work, hand-picked academics speak for the world’s religions and try to prove that an abortion is a “sacred right” in each of their religions (see their website, www.sacredchoices.org). Besides this, the “Religious Coalition for Reproductive Choice” (www.rcrc.org) has gathered “official position statements from U. S. religious bodies” to argue that “the right to choose an abortion is a religiously-grounded right” and “religiously orthodox.” To oppose this “strong consensus” would be “fascistic.” 6 Thus, access to an abortion is redefined today as a “sacred right.”

Why are the defenders of abortion suddenly elbowing forward as spokesmen for several religions? Daniel Maguire explains that they want to “change international discourse” on abortion and defend it anew as “solidly grounded in the world’s great religions.” Note his word change. He admits that this strategy is a novelty. Its goal is to charge governments that “restrict” access to abortion with “abusing the religious freedom of many—in some cases, most—of their citizens.” 7 Maguire, a professor of theology at Marquette University, assures us that ours is not a “postreligious age,” since “major scientists” agree that the problems of the globe cannot be solved unless people acquire a “vision of the sacred.” 8 In 1990, thirty-four scientists led by Carl Sagan appealed to the world’s religions to help safeguard the planet, declaring: “Religion has been part of the problem. It has to be part of the solution.... Nothing so stirs the human will as the tincture of the sacred.” 9 Yes, they said tincture. They asked for a flavor of the “sacred.”

What is the meaning of the word sacred in Daniel Maguire’s two recent titles, Sacred Choices and Sacred Rights? In his great English
Dictionary, Samuel Johnson defined *sacred* as holy, devoted to religious uses, consecrated, inviolable. So why make abortion *sacred*? Jose Barzelatto and Elizabeth Dawson explain that religion has “an even more important role to play” now than before in making abortion available worldwide, because the concern is no longer about “numbers,” but about “values.” Since 1994, individuals from many world religions have been meeting in Manila, Bogota, and elsewhere, mapping out a new strategy to ensure that people learn about abortion from a “pluralistic” perspective. Why “pluralistic”? Because, Maguire explains, Rome must be sidelined: “The anomalous and influential presence of the Vatican in the United Nations and its alliance with conservative Muslim states on family planning issues give only one narrow view from the field of religious ethics. We seek to counter that undue and deceptive monism....”

Like Prometheus in Greek mythology, Maguire is stealing fire from the sky and bringing it down to earth; he is taking the “sacred” from the world’s religions and using to make abortion a holy, inviolable part of religious worship. But can abortion be made a “sacred right” without transvaluating the world’s religions? In the concluding essay of *Sacred Rights* Arvind Sharma admits that religions will have to become more “innovative,” “inventive” and “creative” to serve the cause of abortion; they will have to keep the “quality,” but not the “content” of their traditions. He explains that just as people trust the scientific method, even after the content of science has changed, so they will trust the “method of a religion,” even after its teachings have varied. He makes it clear that religion has to be emptied of its substance and reduced to a *tincture*. Religious teachers are to use sleight of hand, replacing virtue with vice, while keeping the same “method” on the outside. For Arvind Sharma, religion is useful because it is the way ordinary people “sustain a coherent vision of the world over time.”

In another concluding essay, Anrudh Jain says that since most religions originated when the global population was small, the “laws and edicts articulated at that time” cannot guide our behavior now. Rather, we have to be directed by “recent interpretations of old teachings.” In effect, he contradicts the thesis of *Sacred Rights*—that
abortion is “grounded” in religious traditions—and admits that ancient
religions will have to be re-interpreted to be usable. Daniel Maguire
himself states that the world’s religions “developed when illiteracy
was the norm, and their teachers often taught the way parents taught
toddlers,” giving them “absolutes.” But now people must no longer be
treated “like unlettered and unthinking children.” In short, the
world’s religions must be reconstructed in “adult” form to make
abortion “sacred.”

In the past twenty years, Maguire has made a 180-degree turn in
his views. In 1983 he was attacking the “unuanced absolutism” of
the Catholic Church, saying, “The theology that produced the
traditional ban on all abortions was not ecumenically sensitive.” Then he still admitted that Catholicism had a “traditional ban on all
abortions.” Now he claims that there are many “traditions” in
Catholicism and “these traditions are richer, more sensitive, and more
subtle than we might believe.” Being pro-life, he now insists, is not
any “more Catholic” than being pro-abortion, whatever popes and
bishops might say, because “the Roman Catholic position on abortion
is pluralistic.” He used to ask for ecumenical sensitivity, but now look
at how he speaks of the bond between pro-life Catholics and
Protestants: he says their “newborn love of fetuses” reminds him of
Luke 23:12, “that same day Herod and Pilate became friends.” In
this startling analogy, the woman who aborts her child stands in the
place of Christ, the incarnate God suffering for man’s redemption.
Those who oppose abortion are in the place of Christ’s persecutors,
Pilate and Herod. Surely it is a transvaluation of religion to make the
aborting female into the savior of the planet.

Maguire is not alone in his new allegation, that abortion is
sanctioned in Catholic tradition. Recently, Daniel Dombrowski and
Robert Delteete, who teach philosophy at Seattle University, have
made this claim in their book, A Brief, Liberal, Catholic Defense of
Abortion. In it they contend that being pro-abortion “may even be
more compatible with Catholic tradition than the current anti-abortion
stance defended by many Catholics and by most Catholic leaders.” By constantly referring to Augustine and Aquinas, they falsely impute
to these two doctors of the Church their own view, that aborting a
child up to the eighth month of pregnancy is nothing more than mowing the “grass” or “pruning a rosebush.” Using sleight of hand, they produce the antiquated biology of these doctors, but cause their ethics to vanish. They hide the fact that these saints condemned abortion as a serious sin at any point of fetal life.

The shift in strategy towards a religious justification of abortion is surely welcome news to abortion advocates, for they have long complained that the pro-life camp held the high moral ground. For example, Beverly Wildung Harrison lamented in 1985 that there was an “aura of moral sanctity” and a “monopoly of moral sanctity” among the defenders of the unborn. She warned that the “greatest strategic problem” for the defenders of abortion was the “widespread assumption” among people that the “pro-lifers have a monopoly on the moral factors that ought to enter into decisions about abortion.” She grieved that “traditionalists have an array of religio-moral terminology at their command” and so have “moral legitimacy” in the eyes of the public. Her word traditionalists for pro-lifers showed that she could not imagine that religious traditions could be used to sanctify abortion as a “sacred right.” The only way Harrison could conceive of abortion as a “moral good” was to oppose it to “compulsory pregnancy.”

In a recent book, Leslie Cannold notes that “few feminists” have ever treated abortion as a moral issue, but that morality will henceforth “remain the hottest topic in the debate.” The past failure to “engage with the moral agenda of the anti-choice movement,” she says, has crippled the “self-respect” of abortion advocates and left them “the losers in the social, ethical, and public relations abortion wars.” Like Maguire, Dombrowski and Deltete, Cannold calls for a new “moral understanding” of abortion, even if it is pure fiction. These are her very words: “We ought to value women’s moral framework and moral values around abortion because they are liberatory and useful in resolving real-life moral strife, not because they—or anything for that matter—can claim to be objectively right.”

Note that she wants “moral values” that will be useful, regardless of whether they are objectively right.
ABORTION: A “SACRED RIGHT” IN JUDAISM AND CHRISTIANITY?

In the second half of this paper, I will examine a number of essays in *Sacred Rights* to show that the authors do not prove what they are supposed to, namely, that abortion is a “sacred right” in each of their ancient traditions. Instead, they prove only that abortion was *permitted* in limited circumstances in some traditions. Surely, “permitted” is a far cry from “sacred.” First, let me point out that the fourteen authors in *Sacred Rights* are not dispassionate scholars, since a number of them are active in the pro-abortion organization “Sacred Choices,” which carries their photos on its website. Besides heading this organization, Daniel Maguire has also served on the board of governors of “Catholics for Free Choice,” a group regularly denounced by the Roman Catholic bishops for falsely pretending to represent Catholics.

First, Laurie Zoloth speaks for Judaism and finds it not “consistent” with her tradition for rabbis to urge that the “genocidal losses” of the twentieth century be made up by large families. She concedes that ancient religions took a “strong pronatalist position” in the past and regarded abortion as a “failure,” but she argues that these ancient traditions must be “held in tension with the widespread praxis of abortion” today even in religious communities where abortion is condemned. In her view, then, the practice of abortion in the last thirty years trumps the inherited tradition of 3,000 years. Zoloth admits that Jewish tradition permitted abortion in limited circumstances, as when Maimonides allowed it to save the mother’s life. She has to go up to the eighteenth century to find a rabbi named Jacob Emden who permits abortion to hide an illegitimate birth, and then up to the 1950s to find a rabbi who permits abortion for “mental anguish.” Such examples hardly prove that abortion was a “sacred right” in ancient Judaism.

In *Sacred Choices*, Maguire draws a strange conclusion from Zoloth’s example of Rabbi Emden. This rabbi declared that in the case of a married woman who went astray, “I have pronounced my lenient opinion that it is permitted to abort, and perhaps it even almost has the reward of a *mitzvah*.” Note that Emden said *permitted* and also used *perhaps* and *even almost* as hedges around the word...
mitzvah. Maguire ignores these nuances and exclaims with untrammeled enthusiasm: “A mitzvah is a sacred duty. It is even customary to recite a blessing before doing a mitzvah.... It is not a slight thing, then, to say that an abortion in these circumstances is a meritorious action, a sacred choice, not just something tolerated as a lesser evil.” In one fell swoop Maguire turns a complex statement into a slogan about abortion being a “sacred choice.” His passion blinds him to the actual words of the text.

Contrary to Zoloth and Maguire, David Feldman, in the *Encyclopedia of Bioethics*, observes that the “pronatalist attitude of Judaism” accounts for “its abhorrence of casual abortion, not to mention the self-brutalizing effect. There may be legal sanction for recourse to abortion where necessary, but the position remains one of hesitation before the sanctity of even potential life and a pronatalist reverence for the gift of life.” Feldman finds that in Jewish tradition, abortion is not warranted “for reasons other than deeply serious ones, parallel to the gravity of the deed.” Like Feldman, Rachel Biale states that even those Jewish authorities who base “their ruling on the principle that a fetus is not a person allow abortion only in the gravest circumstances ... only to save the life of the mother.” Even lenient rabbis, she points out, allow abortions only when there is a “physical (not psychological) hazard to the mother.” Thus, no “sacred right” to abortion exists in traditional Judaism.

In the second essay, Christine Gudorf argues that there is no need to “simply accept” the Catholic ban on abortion, because one of the sources of truth in Catholicism is the “sense of the faithful,” which carries an “authority of its own and must be consulted by ecclesial authorities.” What she does not report is that this “sense of the faithful” is defined as what Catholics have believed in all times and places. She also argues that there is no need to obey the pope and bishops on abortion because the Church has a “venerable tradition of respect for individual conscience” and both theologians and bishops say that “the voice of conscience must be obeyed.” And so, when a few theologians dissent from the hierarchy, she tells us we “may follow any probable opinion of a theological expert.” Even if this were true, which it is not, nowhere does Gudorf prove that abortion is
a “sacred right” in Catholic tradition.

In the third essay, Gloria Albrecht explains that the “Protestant Principle” forbids us from turning “our own ideas” into “idols.” Fundamentalist Protestants, however, have fallen into the “idolatry of familism—the belief that ‘saving’ the heterosexual, two-parent family solves most, if not all, of our social problems.” They also want to stop change by opposing a “safe, surgical abortion as a form of birth control.” Their idolatry and lack of openness to change means that they have abandoned the Protestant “project.” For even though the Reformers defended “the full humanity of the fetus from its earliest stage,” they opened up a “trajectory” of openness to change that only the defenders of abortion follow.

Albrecht admits that not until the 1970s did “major mainline Protestant denominations” endorse “not abortion per se, but the need for women to be able to exercise the freedom of their own consciences in their difficult decisions necessitated by unwanted pregnancies.” Even then, she concedes, they held “that the sacredness of life includes fetal life.” Like Zoloth and Gudorf, she writes as if the last thirty years trump the moral teachings of all previous generations. Even so, she is far from proving that a “sacred right” to abortion is grounded in Protestantism.

In his summing up at the end of Sacred Rights, Arvind Sharma contends that Judaism and Christianity both provide a handle for supporters of abortion: in Judaism, every text is open to a “fresh interpretation”; in Catholicism, there is a split between “papal teaching and historical fact”; and in Protestantism, there is individualism and a “demarcation between secular and sacred.” What he says is that these religions can be newly interpreted to defend abortion. This is no proof that abortion was actually held “sacred” in those traditions.

ABORTION, A “SACRED RIGHT” IN ISLAM?

After this, Sa’diyya Shaikh argues that Muslim tradition is “flexible” on abortion, even though contemporary Muslim societies are “rigid” due to fear of a “conspiracy by western powers to limit the growth
and power of the Muslim world.” Their flexibility appears in the legal records of Islam that show a wide range of positions on abortion before the 120th day, the day on which an angel was believed to breathe a spirit into the fetus; afterwards, abortion was a “criminal offence,” except where the mother’s life was in danger or the fetus expected to be “deformed.” This essay outlines four legal positions on abortion up to the 120th day: unconditional permission, conditional permission, strong disapproval, and unconditional prohibition. The problem with this account is that Sa’diyya Shaikh does not say how widely acceptable each position was in medieval Islam. Also the word permission in the first two positions shows that abortion was not “sacred,” for had it been so, it would have been at least “recommended.” In the Encyclopedia of Bioethics, Osman Bakar tells us that Islam classifies human acts into five categories: obligatory, recommended, allowable, blameworthy, and forbidden. He explains that “Abortion, at the most liberal level, has been placed by jurists in the third category, that of the allowable.” He adds that jurists allowed abortions even in the first 120 days “mostly on medical and health grounds,” assigning penalties to “convicted wrongdoers.” If abortion had been a “sacred right,” it would not have been limited even in the first 120 days.

We learn from Fazlur Rahman, in another collection of essays, that the “majority” of medieval Muslim jurists were in fact opposed to giving easy permission to abort. He states that “several medieval jurists had permitted abortion within four months of pregnancy before the fetus was ‘ensouled,’ although the majority opposed it because the fetus was ‘going to be ensouled’ and the coming into being of new life was not, therefore, a remote possibility but a ripe potentiality which could not be destroyed.” Nevertheless, this author thinks there exists in Islam “the possibility of general acceptance of abortion within four months.” His word possibility, however, suggests a modern development, not a millennium-old “sacred right.”

ABORTION, A “SACRED RIGHT” IN HINDUISM AND BUDDHISM?

In Sacred Rights, Sandya Jain admits that in ancient Hinduism,
abortion was a “heinous crime,” “the basest of sins,” and an “atrocious” act demanding “retribution.” Hinduism had an “implacable aversion to abortion” even in cases of illegitimacy, because it was believed the soul enters at conception and brings along its past *karma*. However, there were medical texts that gave advice about getting “rid of unwanted pregnancies,” so abortions were practiced in antiquity. Since 1971, too, India has provided women with abortion on demand. If this practice contradicted India’s religious traditions, she contends, Hindu religious teachers would not be silent about abortions, while remaining “quite vocal” about “cow slaughter.” All she proves is that physicians knew how to give abortions in ancient India, not that these were regarded as a “sacred right” by religious leaders.

In the conclusion of *Sacred Rights*, Arvind Sharma argues that even if the “main body of revealed literature in Hinduism frowns upon abortion,” there is “a body of literature called Ayur Veda” which “allows it” and which “enjoys the status of a revelation as part of the larger corpus.” Not so fast. In another collection of essays, S. Cromwell Crawford points out that the medical books of Hinduism existed in collaboration with the main religious tradition: the medical texts were not a dissenting tradition, because “from ancient times, the tradition out of which the medical manuals speak placed the highest premium on life in the womb. Feticide was killing.” Thus, when medical manuals like the *Susruta Samhita* recommended abortion, it was only “in difficult cases,” where the fetus was “irreparably damaged or defective.” And so, no “sacred right” to abortion existed in ancient Hindu tradition either.

In still another essay, Parichart Suwanbubbha argues that in the tradition of Thai Buddhism there is room “to justify the deliberate choices of abortion.” First, though, the author admits that in Buddhism the soul enters at conception, so the value of the embryo is the same as that of a born person. Even so, Buddhist morality is all about “intention,” so one must distinguish between an abortion with a bad intention, such as greed or selfishness, and an abortion with a good intention: the first would bring about a severe retribution, while the second would be “a forgivable sin,” though it would have to be
atoned for with good deeds. Only the woman having an abortion would know what her intentions were and how severe her retribution will be. She can always ask the dead child’s forgiveness by prayer and alms. This essay does not prove there ever was a “sacred right” to abortion in Thai Buddhism. It shows that, at best, abortion is only a “forgivable sin” that needs to be atoned for by prayer and good deeds.

ABORTION, A “SACRED RIGHT” IN CHINESE TRADITION?

Geling Shang observes there has been little resistance to the one-child policy imposed by the Communist Chinese government, though the policy seems “coercive and even violent” to the West. She admits that in antiquity, abortions were performed secretly by midwives, not by official physicians, and that they were believed to incur “harmful, unhealthy, unnatural, and even shameful consequences.” Even so, in the *Table of Merits and Errors* from the Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368), abortion was listed as only a 300-point error, compared to the 1,000-point error of murdering an infant or adult. The author argues in defense of abortion that Chinese tradition expected the individual to sacrifice himself for his family, “so why not a fetus?” Besides, the traditional family regarded children as “private property.” So there might be “humanistic,” but not “religious” objections, to China’s “coercive campaign” to use abortion as a “supplemental means of birth control.” It is “traditional belief,” not Communist ideology, she insists, that makes abortion possible on a vast scale in China. Like the rest of *Sacred Rights*, this essay fails to prove that there ever was a “sacred right” to abortion in Chinese tradition. After all, a “300-point error” is not the same as a meritorious deed. As an “error,” too, abortion entailed harmful consequences. The lack of resistance to the government’s coercive use of abortion today can far more reasonably be attributed to fear of punishment than to “traditional belief.”

*SACRED RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY*

If abortion could ever be justified as “sacred” in the world’s religions—something the essays in *Sacred Rights* fail to do—it would follow that abortion would be protected under religious liberty. This is the point
of the well-funded project, for Maguire announces triumphantly, as if the case were proven, “To criminalize a right that is grounded in the world’s major religions is criminal itself. It is also a form of religious persecution.”

What Maguire has done in *Sacred Rights* can legitimately be called “sacrilege.” Samuel Johnson defined *sacrilege* as “the crime of appropriating to himself what is devoted to religion; the crime of robbing heaven; the crime of violating or profaning things sacred.” In *Sacred Rights*, Maguire has committed this crime. He and his cohorts have appropriated the “sacred” from the world’s major religions and applied it to the killing of unborn children. Let them ponder the usual fate of sacrilege, as exemplified in Belshazzar’s feast and the writing on the wall (Dan. 5).

### Notes


5. The book was published in twenty-four cities worldwide.


19. Ibid., pp. 44, 36.
22. Ibid., p. xxiii.
23. This fact is mentioned in a note preceding the “official mission statement” of Catholics for Free Choice, 1996 Reader, p. 121.
25. Ibid., p. 40.
26. Sacred Choices, p. 103.

30. Ibid., p. 71.


32. Ibid., pp. 99, 85.

33. Ibid., pp. 88, 99, 97.

34. Ibid., pp. 94-95.


37. Ibid., pp. 121-22.


41. Ibid., pp. 136, 140.

42. “Conclusion,” *Sacred Rights*, p. 280.


45. Ibid., pp. 155, 157.

46. Ibid., pp. 159-60.


48. Ibid., pp. 231-32.

49. Ibid., pp. 232-33.
A massive fire devastated an 18th century mission church in San Gabriel, in the Archdiocese of Los Angeles, July 11. Archbishop Jose Gomez of Los Angeles called the fire at San Gabriel Mission church, founded by St. Junipero Serra, “devastating.” The fire began early Saturday morning around 4 a.m. and destroyed the roof and interior of the 249-year-old structure. Local firefighters said they responded to an initial alarm at 4:24. By the time they arrived, smoke and flames were visible from outside the church which is a California Historical Landmark. Battling the four-alarm fire eventually required access a free summary of Stealing Fire, by Steven Kotler et al. and 20,000 other business, leadership and nonfiction books on getAbstract. Analytical You’ll get advice that can be directly applied in the workplace or in everyday situations. Applicable You’ll understand the inner workings of the subject matter. Background You’ll get contextual knowledge as a frame for informed action or analysis. Bold You’ll find arguments that may break with predominant views. Comprehensive You’ll find every aspect of the subject matter covered. Concrete Examples You get practical advice illustrated with examples of real-world applications or anecdotes. Eloquent You’ll enjoy a masterfully written or presented text.